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A SUMMARY OF ARTICLES 3 AND 4 AND
THEIR IMPACT IN NEW YORK*
Norman Penneyt
This article on articles 3 (Commercial Paper) and 4 (Bank Deposits
and Collections) is written for publication in a New York oriented sym-
posium on the Uniform Commercial Code. Synposia of this type are
directed primarily toward practitioners who must cope with a new and
far-reaching statute. Page limitations impel the writer to cast such a
paper in the form of a survey highlighting the more significant innova-
tions. The literature abounds in such articles, annotated to the law of
one state or another.' This article will not vary significantly from the
familiar format. Assuming that the draftsmen devoted considerable time
to organizing and ordering the parts and sections of the Code being
discussed, this article will deal with each part consecutively, discussing
those provisions worthy of mention in a paper of this character. The
* Copyright 0 1962 Norman Penney. All Rights Reserved.
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mercial Code," 40 Mich. St. B.J. 17 (August 1961); Love, "How the Adoption of the Uni-
form Commercial Code Would Affect the Law of Bank Deposits and Collections in Oregon,"
32 Ore. L. Rev. 25, 156, 288 (1952-53); Sneed & Morrison, "Bank Collections-A Compara-
tive Study," 29 Texas L. Rev. 713 (1951); Trumbull, "Bank Deposits and Collections in
Illinois Under the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code," 55 Nw. U.L. Rev. 253 (1960); Wil-
son, "How the Adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code Would Affect the Law of Bank
Deposits and Collections in Oregon," 30 Ore. L. Rev. 359 (1951); Comment, 18 Wash. & Lee
L. Rev. 350 (1961).
Bibliographies containing additional law review commentaries may be found in Goodrich
& Wolkin, The Story of the American Law Institute, 1923-1961 at 48-66 (1961) and through-
out the annotations to articles 3 and 4 in I Uniform Commercial Code (Unif. Laws Ann.)
359-568; 2 Uniform Commercial Code (Unif. Laws Ann.) 1-100 (1962).
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reader may follow the discussion by turning the pages of the new statute
as he proceeds through the article. The author has attempted to anno-
tate the discussion to present law, particularly the law of New York.
References are also made to the most helpful periodical and textual
literature in the field. Readers wishing to pursue. any particular problem
in depth should consult the vast body of discussion and reference ma-
terial found in the Reports of the New York Law Revision Commission.2
Though some of this material is obsolete because of ch nges made in the
1957 official text, the use of the New York Annotatiois to the Commer-
cial Code' as a supplement to the Law Revision C£pmmission studies
should make the commentaries and references ext emly valuable. New
York is unique in having such a thorough body of transitional literature.
ARTICLE 3
Article 3 is largely a modern-day revision of the,.Negotiable Instru-
ments Law. There are relatively few changes. -In many instances the
language employed in the Negotiable Instruments Law is used verbatim.
In most cases negotiable instruments problems will be~resolved in exactly
the same manner as they were under the N.I.L. Article 3 will produce
relatively few redrafting projects.
One might well question the necessity.. of revising the N.I.L. The
Negotiable Instruments Law has received its fair share of criticism. This
first effort at uniform legislation was subjected to heavy attack almost
from the outset4 and has accumulated a great body of criticism since
the turn of the century.' The character of the criticisms prompting a
revision of the N.I.L. fall into four general categories. First, the Nego-
2 Mulvaney, "Checklist of New York Law Revision Commission Materials on the Uni-
form Commercial Code," 53 L. Lib. J. 29 (1960). - %-
3 Hogan & Penney, "Annotations of the Uniform Commercial Code to the Statutory and
Decisional Law of New York State," New York Annotations to Uniform Commercial Code
and Report of Commission on Uniform Commercial Code (N.Y. C06cm'n on Uniform State
Laws 1961). See also N.Y. Comm'n on Uniform State Laws,- Supplementary Report on the
Uniform Commercial Code (1962) (describing and commenting upoh the variations in the
New York enactment of the UCC); Comm'n on Uniform State Laws of the Ass'n of the
Bar of the City of New York, Report on the Uniform Commercial Code (1962) (assessing
the extent to which the UCC (1958) meets the recommendations 'nd criticisms of the New
York Law Revision Commission).
4 The earliest and most influential critic was Dean Ames of the Harvard Law School,
a party to the famous "Ames-Brewster Contrqversy." McKeehan, Uhe Negotiable Instru-
ments Law (A Review of the Ames-Brewster Controversy)" (pts.. 1-3), 50 Am. L. Register
437, 499, 561 (1,902). .
5 See, e.g., Beutel, "The Negotiable Instruments Act Should NoJ.Be Amended," 80 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 368 (1932); Brannan, "Some Necessary Amendments of the Negotiable Instruments
Law," 26 Harv. L. Rev. 493, 588 (1913); Britton, "Proposed Anrendments to the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law," 22 Ill. L. Rev. 815 (1928); Hening, "The Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law. Is It Producing Uniformity and Certainty in the Law Merchant?" 59 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 471, 532 (1911). A host of other articles containing commentaries and criticisms
may be found in the bibliography to the fourth edition of Professor Britton's casebook,
Britton, Cases on Bills and Notes xix-xxxi (4th ed. 1951).
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tiable Instruments Law has suffered by virtue of strained judicial inter-
pretations attempting to bring too many types of instruments within the
statute.6 Second, the Negotiable Instruments Law has been criticized
.as poorly organized.7 There are some antiquated provisions which have
never been utilized.8 Third, the courts of the various states have taken
different approaches in interpreting certain sections of the N.I.L.9 and
many legislatures have adopted nonuniform amendments'0 so that the
law as now applied is anything but uniform. Finally, there are many
technical flaws or open questions arising under the N.I.L. which the
Code draftsmen have sought to correct and answer. Among these
questions, are:
1. Is it possible to convert bearer paper to order paper by indorse-
ment? 11
2. Afe both acceptance and payment within the finality rule of Price
v. Neal?"2
3. M.y a payee be a holder in due course?'"
6 Hawkland, Cases on Bills and Notes 25-28 (1956); Cosway, "Innovations in Articles
Three and Four of the Uniform Commercial Code," 16 Law & Contemp. Prob. 284, 285-86(1951); Leary, "Some Clarifications in the Law of Commercial Paper Under the Proposed
Uniform Commercial Code," 97 U. Pa. L. Rev. 354, 355-57 (1949).
7 Sutherland, "Article 3-Commerdal Paper," Uniform Commercial Code of Massachusetts
153, 156-57 (1958).
8 N.IL. §§ 161-77 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law §§ 280-306) (acceptance and payment
for honor). A search for cases annotated to these sections will readily demonstrate the few
times that these provisions have been involved in commercial litigation. The writer recog-
nizes, but questions, the argument that this is merely indicative of the clarity and compre-
hensiveness of these sections.
9 Cosway, supra note 6, at 287; Hening, supra note 5.
10 Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law 110-208 (Beutel 7th ed. 1948) (statutory vari-
ations are annotated to the portion of this book setting forth "The Original Negotiable
Instruments Act and Commissioners' Notes").
11 This is the dilemma produced by the conflict between N.I.L. §§ 9(5) and 40. See
Britton, Bills and Notes 146-49 (2d ed. 1961). Leary, supra note 6, at 380-81 (1949);
See discussion of UCC § 3-204 in text following note 58, infra.
12 Britton, supra note 11, at 380-81. Aigler, "Two Significant Recent Decisions in Nego-
tiable Instruments," 2 Ariz. L. Rev. 1, 7-16 (1960). See discussion of UCC § 3-418 in text
following note 174, infra.
13 Aigler, "Payees as Holders in Due Course," 36 Yale LJ. 608 (1927). Britton, "Holder
in Due Course-A Comparison of the Provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law with
those of Article 3 of the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code," 49 Nw. U.L. Rev. 417, 442-
43 (1954) ; Britton, "The Payee As A Holder In Due Course," 1 U. Chi. L. Rev. 728 (1934) ;
Feezer, "May the Payee of a Negotiable Instrument Be A Holder in Due Course?" 9 Minn.
L. Rev. 101 (1925); Palmer, "Negotiable Instruments Under the Uniform Commercial
Code," 48 Mich. L. Rev. 255, 276 (1950).
UCC § 3-302(2) clearly permits payees to qualify as holders in due course. Although the
Court of Appeals has not passed directly on this point, the Code provision seems to accord
with the weight of lower court authority in New York. Zanetti v. Malanga, 19 Misc. 2d
862, 190 N.Y.S.2d 185 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County 1959); South Shore Sec. Co. v. Goode, 5 Misc.
2d 972, 162 N.Y.S.2d 962 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1957); Yokohama Specie Bank v. Milbert
Importing Corp., 182 Misc. 281, 44 N.Y.S.2d 71 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1943); First
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Conzo, 169 Misc. 268, 7 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Sup. Ct. Chemung County
1938). Contra, Alpert v. City Motor Sales, 194 Misc. 909, 90 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Albany City
Ct. 1949).
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4. Shouldn't a rule governing the imposter payee problem be
- codified?14
5. Why should a bank suffer a loss on an undelivered incomplete
instrument in the case where a customer has signed a blank check and
left it on his desk top?',
Part 1: Form and Interpretation
A. Types of Paper Covered and Excluded (3-103, 3-104)
Article 3 is limited to commercial paper. Bank collections, letters of
credit, investment securities and secured transactions are dealt with
elsewhere.' Athough comment 5 to section 3-104 makes clear that the
Code does not require the presence of particular words in instruments
-to make them negotiable, the elimination of N.I.L. section 101' and the
language of 3-104(1) (b)' 8 do appear to make the Code more stringent
* than the N.I.L. on the question of negotiability.
B. Negotiability: Unconditionality (3-105, 3-112)
Under present law a note payable only out of a particular fund is non-
negotiable; 19 no exception is made in the case of instruments issued by
governmental agencies or units.2" The Code creates an exception to the
decisional law rule as to governmental paper and conforms with statutes.
conferring negotiability upon certain municipal obligations.2 ' Many of
11 Palmer, supra note 13, at 284-88; Britton, supra note 11, at 440-47. See discussion
of UCC § 3-405 in text following note 126, infra.
15 Britton, supra note 11, at 204-09. See discussion of UCC § 3-115 in text following
note 39, infra. Britton, "Defenses, Claims of Ownership and Equities-A Comparison of
the Provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law with Corresponding Provisions of Article
3 of the Proposed Commercial Code," 7 Hastings L.J. 1, 11-12 (1955); Cosway, supra note
6, at 268; Palmer, supra note 13, at 265-67.
16 These are dealt -with in articles 4, 5, 8, and 9, respectively.
17 N.I.L. § 10 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 29) Terms, when sufficient.
The instrument need not follow the language of this chapter, but any terms are
sufficient which clearly indicate an intention to conform to the requirements hereof.
18 Section 3-104(1) (b) states:
Any writing to be a negotiable instrument with this Article must . . . (b) contain
an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money and no other prom-
ise, order, obligation or power given by the maker or drawer except as authorized
by this Article; and .
19 N.IL. § 3 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 22). Accord, UCC § 3-105(2)(b).
20 Bull v. Sims, 23 N.Y. 570 (1861) (pre-N.I.L. case assessing negotiability of muiicipaI
warrants by same standards as applied to ordinary makers). Kohn v. Sacramento lec.
Gas & Ry., 168 Cal. 1, 141 Pac. 626 (1914); cf. County Comm'r v. Bank of GastoNia, .157
N.C. 191, 72 S.E. 996 (1911). Hawkland, supra note 6, at 35-36. See also the critical
comment with respect to greater liability being assumed by indorsers of such instruments.
in Hill, supra note 1, at 112; Benton v. Freedom Township Supervisors, 118 Pa. Super. 229,
178 Atl. 520 (1935); Bank of California, NA. v. National City Co., 141 Wash. 243, 251
Pac. 561 (1926). See also Manker v. American Say. Bank & Trust Co., 131 Wash. 430,
230 Pac. 406 (1924).
21 See, e.g., N.Y. Local Fin. Law § 161.00 and the many sections of the N.Y. Pub. Auth.
Law cited in the N.Y. annotation to this subsection, Hogan & Penney, supra note 3, at
94-95.
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the instruments issued by governmental entities would probably qualify
as "investment securities" under article 8.22 The Code also broadens the
present rule affording negotiability to instruments payable only out of
the assets of unincorporated associations by permitting payment to be
limited to the assets of a partnership, trust or estate.2
In addition to continuing the rule permitting a statement of the trans-
action giving rise to the instrument, the Code permits inclusion of some
of the common provisions found in so-called "long form" notes. The
most important of these new provisions are found in the subsection per-
mitting reference to a separate agreement.' In New York this provision
has been further extended by the addition of language permitting refer-
.ence to a "separate agreement for rights as to prepayment or accelera-
tion."2 This section describing when a promise or order is unconditional
also includes a specific subsection stipulating that language in instruments
providing for maturity in accordance with or "as per" certain transac-
tions does not render them unconditional.26  A later subsection denies
negotiability to instruments made "subject to or governed by" other
agreements.2 7 While these provisions have been criticized as overly con-
cerned with detail, the empirical and arbitrary criteria have been sup-
,ported as the only realistic way to sort out or distinguish phrases render-
ing promises either conditional or unconditional.2
In conjunction with section 3-105, one should read the section setting
forth the "terms and omissions not affecting negotiability." 29 Of par-
22 See the broad, functional definition of a "security" in UCC § 8-102(1) (a).
23 UCC § 3-105(1) (h). In accord as to instruments payable only out of the assets of an
unincorporated association is Hibbs v. Brown, 190 N.Y. 167, 82 N.E. 1108 (1907), 8 Colum.
L. Rev. 215, 216, 233 (1908). Permitting payment to be limited to the assets of a partner-
ship, trust or estate may change the law of New York. See Hibbs v. Brown, supra, at 178,
.82 N.E. at 1111, 1112, distinguishing partnerships from unincorporated associations. See
also Schmittler v. Simon, 101 N.Y. 554, 5 N.E. 452 (1886), which implies that a draft
payable only out of the assets of an estate is nonnegotiable. See generally, Britton,
supra note 11, at 36-37.
24 UCC § 3-105(1)(c).
25 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 553 § 3-105(1) (c) (effective Sept. 27, 1964).
(1) A promise or order otherwise unconditional is not made conditional by the fact
that the instrument ...
(c) refers to or states that it arises out of a separate agreement or refers to a separate
agreement for rights as to prepayment or acceleration . . . . (Italicized portion added
in N.Y.)
For a brief discussion of. this and other New York variations, see Penney, "New York
Revisits the Code-Some Variations in the New York Enactment of the Uniform Com-
-mercial Code," 62 Colum. L. Rev. 992, 994-96 (1962).
26 UCC § 3-105(1) (b). This seems to accord with present law. Public Natl Bank &
Trust Co. v. Garcia Sugars Corp., 173 Misc. 364, 16 N.Y.S.2d 914 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1939), aff'd, 259 App. Div. 878, 20 N.Y.S.2d 1015, motion for leave to appeal denied, 259
App. Div. 1001, 21 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1st Dep't 1940), aff'd, 285 N.Y. 661, 33 N.E.2d 867
(1941); Hawkland, supra note 6, at 18-19. See Note, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 560, 565 (1919).
27 UCC § 3-105(2) (a). Accord, Old Colony Trust Co. v. Stumpel, 247 N.Y. 538, 161
N.E. 173 (1928). For further cases see Hawkland, supra note 6, at 18-19.28 Compare Hawkland, supra note 6, at 18-19 (approving), with Cosway, supra note 6,
at 295 (critical).
29 UCC § 3-112.
1962]
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ticular importance in the latter section is the provision that "the negotia-
bility of an instrument is not affected by ... a promise or power to main-
tain or protect collateral or give additional collateral... ,, oThis new pro-
vision, reflecting the dictum of First Nat'[ Bank v. Blackman,"' has been
further modified in New York by the addition of language permitting
covenants to "furnish financial information or to do or refrain from doing
any other act for the protection of the obligation. . . " This added lan-
guage was apparently designed to support covenants to maintain working
capital, to restrict dividends, to provide a sinking fund, not to raise
salaries, and the like."
C. Negotiability: Definite Time (3-109)
There are two notable provisions relating to the requirement that a
negotiable instrument be payable at a definite time. N.I.L. section 4(3)'
permits instruments payable at death or at a fixed period after death"4
to qualify as payable at a determinable future time. The Code reverses
this rule."* Secondly, and more important, the Code solves the much liti-
gated question of when instruments subject to acceleration are negotia-
ble. 6 A note subject to acceleration at the sole option of the holder, as
for example upon the holder's "deeming himself insecure," is nevertheless
negotiable; an instrument may be subject to "any acceleration.""ST The
30 UCC § 3-112()(c).
31 249 N.Y. 322, 164 N.E. 113 (1928).
32 This amendment represents a partial retreat from the attempt of the Code draftsmen
to "bring the note back ... to its original concept of being... 'a courier without luggage'."'
1954 N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n Rep. 506 (testimony of Professor Mentschikoff in Law
Revision Commission hearings). This same subsection was changed as a result of the
deliberations between the 1952 and the 1957 official text in order to meet the very same
points advanced by the New York Clearing House Association in the 1954 hearings. Com-
pare 1954 Law Rev. Comm'n Rep., 505 with ALl Recommendations on UCC 93 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as 1956 Recommendations]. See also Penney, supra note 25, at 996. The
banking lawyers, however, apparently.. felt that the 1957 draft did not go far enough.
Although the liberalized New York variation may accord with present New York law this
does not justify adoption of this variation on a national basis unless the practice and
demands elsewhere require this additional "luggage." Many instruments with this type of
provision will probably be controlled by article 8. See UCC § 8-102 (1) (a).
33 N.I.L. § 4 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § (23)). Determinable Future Time: What
Constitutes.
An instrument is payable at a determinable future time, within the meaning of this act,
which is expressed to be payable ...
(3) On or at a fixed period after the occurrence of a specified event, which is certain
to happen, though the time of happening be uncertain....
34 Hegeman v. Moon, 131 N.Y. 462, 30 N.E. 487 (1892); Carnwright v. Gray, 127 N.Y.
92, 27 N.E. 835 (1891). See, however, dictum in Kerr v. Smith, 156 App. Div. 807, 142 N.Y.
Supp. 57 (1st Dep't 1913). See Cosway, supra note 6, at 296.
35 UCC § 3-109(2):
An instrument which by its terms is otherwise payable only upon an act or event
uncertain as to time of occurrence is not payable at a definite time even though the
act or event has occurred.
36 See Palmer, supra note 13, at 262-64; Britton, "Formal Requisites of Negotiability-
the Negotiable Instruments Law Compared With the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code,"
26 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 1, 11-15 (1953); Chafee, "Acceleration Provisions in Time Paper,"
32 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 775 (1919); Note, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 835 (1953).
37 UCC § 3-109(1) (c).
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maker of a note is protected from an arbitrary and unreasonable acceler-.
ation by the provision in section 1-208, which requires that the holder
"in good faith believe[s] that the prospect of payment or performance
is impaired.""8
D. Incomplete Undelivered Instruments (3-115)
As mentioned above, negotiable instruments students have long been
troubled that nondelivery and unauthorized completion together consti-
tute a real defense.39 Certainly the remote holder in due course cannot
better protect himself in the taking of such paper and has no fewer
equities than a holder of delivered but unauthorizedly completed paper
or nondelivered but properly completed paper. The drawer of a check
signed in blank and left where it can be easily pilfered should not be
protected as against the payor bank which innocently pays a stolen,
conmpleted and cashed check. The Code reverses the N.I.L. and case
law by making nondelivery of an incomplete instrument a personal
defense." This is the more equitable rule and is extended to payor banks
by a comparable provision in article 4.41 At the suggestion of the New
York Law.Revision Commission, a qualification to the counterpart rule
in article 4 was added denying protection to a bank with notice that the
completion was improper.4 2
38 As so limited, the Code appears to accord with present New York Law. N.Y. Nego-
tiable Instr. Law § 23(1) (2) (3); Higgins v. Hocking Valley R.R., 188 App. Div. 684, 177
N.Y. Supp. 444 (1st Dep't 1919); Lincoln Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Marsh, 24 N.Y.S.2d 281
(Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1940); Glide v. Sheridan, 173 Misc. 542, 18 N.Y.S.2d 339 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1939). But see Old Colony Trust Co. v. Stumpel, 126 Misc. 375, 379, 213
N.Y. Supp. 536, 539-40, aff'd, 219 App. Div. 771, 220 N.Y. Supp. 893 (1st Dep't 1927), aff'd
on other grounds 247 N.Y. 538, 161 N.E. 173 (1928) (that an instrument accelerable upon
the holder's deeming himself insecure is nonnegotiable). See generally Britton, supra note 11,
at 63-67, and cases cited therein.
39 N.I.L. § 15 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 34) provides:
Where an incomplete instrument has not been delivered it will not, if completed and
negotiated, without authority, be a valid contract in the hands of any holder, as
against any person whose signature was placed thereon before delivery.
See Holzman, Cohen & Co. v. Teague, 172 App. Div. 75, 158 N.Y. Supp. 211 (1st Dep't
1916); Linick v. A. J. Nutting & Co., 140 App. Div. 265, 125 N.Y. Supp. 93 (2d Dep't
1910). For criticisms of this rule and citations to many cases, see Britton, supra note 15,
at 11-12. Palmer, supra note 13, at 265-67; Sutherland, "Article 3-Logic, Experience and
Negotiable Paper," 1952 Wis. L. Rev. 230, 245-46. See generally, Britton, supra note 11, at
204-09; Brady, Bank Checks 70-71 (Bailey ed. 1962), reprinted from 78 Banking L.J. 737,
750-53 (1961).
40 UCC § 3-115(2). See also UCC § 3-305(2) which providesthat a holder in due course
takes free of all but certain enumerated defenses (not including incompleteness combined
with failure of deliveryL and UCC § 3-407(3) which permits a subsequent holder in due
course to enforce as completed, an incomplete instrument which has been completed.
41 UCC § 4-401(2)(b).
42 UCC § 4-401: When Bank May Charge Customers Account.
(2) A bank which in good faith makes payment to a holder may charge the indicated
account of its customer according to . * *
(b) the tenor of his completed item, even though the bank knows the item has been
completed unless the bank has notice that the completion was improper.
The italicized portion was changed in 1956 Recommendations to meet a suggestion made
1962]
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E. Miscellaneous
A few minor changes wrought by part I of article 3 require brief
mention. The Code effects a change in present law by permitting alter-
native drawees. 43 Alternative drawees are occasionally named in dividend
and insurance checks as a matter of commercial convenience. The Code
also contains a new provision permitting domestic negotiable instruments
to be payable in foreign currency.44 New York varied the official text
of this provision by permitting the satisfaction of even instruments pay-
able only in a specified foreign currency by "payment of that number
of dollars which the stated foreign currency will purchase at the buying
sight rate for that currency."J In addition the Code contains a new
section providing that an instrument "payable through" a bank desig-
nates that institution as collecting bank to make presentment though
not itself authorizing that bank to pay.46 Finally, part 2 contains a novel
section concerning the accrual of a cause of action .4 7 While according
generally with decisional law,48 this section changes the time for accrual
of a cause of action against a drawer of a draft or indorser of any
instrument. Under the Code49 the statute of limitation runs from notice
of dishonor or other demand rather than from dishonor as is the present
rule.5" A change in the New York enactment of this Code provision was
made to avoid the possibility that interest might run on cashier's checks
or demand certificates of deposit from their dates. 1
by the New York Law Revision Commission. 1956 Recommendations supra note 32, at 159;
1956 N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n Rep. 430 (app. IV); 1955 N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n Rep. 1478(Mulvaney, Study of U.C.C. § 4-401).
43 UCC § 3-102(1)(b). Contra, N.I.L. § 128 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 212). See
in support of this change made by the Code, Ogden, Negotiable Instruments 105 (5th ed.
1947) ; Cosway, supra note 6, at 293.
44 UCC § 3-107. Contra, Thompson v. Sloan, 23 Wend. 71 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1840)
(instrument payable in foreign currency and to be paid in the United States not payable
in money and hence nonnegotiable). In accord with the Code, see Incitti v. Ferrante, 12 N.J.
Misc. 840, 175 At. 908 (C.P. Bergen County 1933). See generally Britton, supra note 11, at
72-79; Britton, supra note 15, at 19-21; Cosway, supra note 6, at 295-96; Oliphant, "The
Theory of Money in the Law of Commercial Instruments," 29 Yale L.J. 606, 619-24 (1920) ;
Perkins, "May a Promissory Note Be Payable in Foreign Money?" 5 Iowa L. Bull. 209
(1920).
45 For a further description and criticism of this New York variation see Penney, supra
note 25, at 997-98.
46 UCC § 3-120. No New York cases on point were found. For cases in other juris-
dictions and criticism of the distinction between "payable through" and "payable at," see
Brannan, supra note 10, at 1022-23.
47 UCC § 3-122.
48 See N.Y. annotations, Hogan & Penney, supra note 3, at 104-05.
49 UCC § 3-122(3).
50 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 15 provides that the cause of action against drawer or indorser
is computed from dishonor ("the time when the right to make the demand is complete"),
not from notice of dishonor or other demand. See also N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law & Rules § 206a
(effective Sept. 1, 1963).
51 Section 3-122(4) (a). The phrase "acceptor or other primary obligor of a demand
instrument" was substituted for "of a demand note" in the New York enactment. Com-
parable changes have been made in Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts and Rhode Island.
1 Uniform Commercial Code (U.L.A.) 409-10 (1962).
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Part 2: Transfer and Negotiation
Although generally in accord with the present law as to terminology
and operative rules,5" this part contains three notable changes or clarifi-
cations.
A. Reacquisition and "Shelter"5" (3-201)
The Code provision spelling out the rights vested in the transferee of
an instrument may serve to clear up the conflict of authorities as to the
reacquisition by an indorsee who has knowledge of a fraud in a transfer
prior to his original acquisition. The law is clearly settled that a reacquir-
ing payee, who had knowledge of the fraud originally, may not acquire
the rights of a later holder in due course, even though the payee was not
a participant.54 There is a split of authority in New York as to the effect
of reacquisition by an indorsee who with knowledge of the fraud negoti-
ated to a holder in due course and later reacquired. In Horan v. Mason,55
the Second Department hlITsuch a reacqiirer to be a holder in due
course. The FourO' contra result."6 The Code
resolves the conflict in favor of the Fourth Department and against the
reacquiring indorsee.57 The new enactment eliminates the opportunity
of persons knowingly to acquire fraud-tainted instruments and improve
their position by channeling such paper through holders in due course.
B. Special Indorsement and Bearer Paper (3-204)
The Code resolves the much discussed problem of the conflict between
N.I.L. sections 9(5) and 40. s The question is whether an instrument
52 See generally Britton, "Transfers and Negotiations Under the Negotiable Instruments
Law and Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code," 32 Texas L. Rev. 153 (1933).
53 The "shelter" principle, permitting a transferee with notice to enjoy the rights of a
holder in due course without notice, from whom the former took, is described in Aragon
Coffee Co. v. Rogers, 105 Va. 51, 52 S.E. 843 (1906). The court stated that a purchaser
from a holder in due course without notice "is entitled to stand in the latter's shoes and
take shelter under his good faith." 105 Va. at 54, 52 S.E. at 844.
54 See N.I.L. § 58 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 97). Gruntal v. National Sur. Co., 254
N.Y. 468, 173 N.E. 682 (1930).
55 141 App. Div. 89, 125 N.Y. Supp. 668 (2d Dep't 1910).
56 Harter v. People's Bank, 221 App. Div. 122, 223 N.Y. Supp. 118 (4th Dep't 1927).
57 UCC § 3-201(1). For a general discussion of this Code provision, see Britton, supra
note 13, 443-46; Cosway, "Innovations in Articles Three and Four of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code," 16 Law & Contemp. Prob. 284, 299-300 (1951); Palmer, supra note 13, at
273-74. For discussion of prior law and collection of cases thereunder, see Britton, supra
note 11, 320-27, 689-98. See also Chafee, "The Reacquisition of a Negotiable Instrument
by a Prior Party," 21 Colum. L. Rev. 538 (1921).
58 N.IL. § 9 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 28). When payable to bearer.
The instrument is payable to bearer
3. Vhen the only or last indorsement is an indorsement in blank.
NI.L. § 40 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 70). Indorsement of instrument payable to bearer.
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payable to bearer either originally in the designation of the payee or sub-
sequently by indorsement can be controlled by a later indorsement. The
majority of courts have held paper originally payable to bearer as ca-
pable of further negotiation by delivery alone, regardless of subsequent
indorsement. 9 . There is some authority for the view that the N.I.L. did
not affect the common law rule that an instrument indorsed in blank
continues negotiable by delivery notwithstanding any special indorse-
ment.6" This view has been much criticized, however, and leading com-
mentators have persuasively argued that in such cases the latest or special
indbrsement controls.61 The Code abandons the "once bearer, always
bearer" rule altogether and g _es ffect to the last indorsement in all
cases.- Under the Code, even paper originally payable to bearer will
require a further indorsement for negotiation when indorsed specially.
The Code rule permitting subsequent holders of the instrument to control
its negotiability is preferable.
C. Restrictive Indorsements (3-205, 3-206)
At the instance of the New York Law Revision Commission, the Code
draftsmen included a provision defining restrictive indorsement in the
1956 Recommendations.63 This definition includes, with slightly different
emphasis, the indorsements formerly described in N.I.L. section 36 but
with the addition of the indorsement described in N.I.L. section 39 as
"conditional. '64 The definitional section treats collection indorsements
Where an instrument, payable to bearer, is indorsed specially, it may nevertheless be
further negotiated by delivery; but the person indorsing specially is liable as indorser
to only such holders as make title through his indorsement.
For general discussion and collection of cases see Britton, supra note 11, at 146-49.
59 See cases collected in Britton, supra note 11, at 147. There are no New York cases
directly in point. In Irving Natl Bank v. Alley, 79 N.Y. 536 (1880), under a statute
preceding the N.I.L., a note payable to the maker was deemed to have the same effect as if
payable to bearer, and was valid though negotiated without the indorsement of such maker.
60 Parker v. Roberts, 243 Mass. 174, 137 N.E. 295 (1922) (N.I.L. sections not men-
tioned), 23 Colum. L. Rev. 488 (1923); 5 Ill. L.Q. 247 (1923).
61 Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law 628-31 (Beutel 7th ed. 1948); McKeehan, "The
Negotiable Instruments Law," 50 Am. L. Reg. 437, 461 (1902).
62 UCC § 3-204(1). For commentary on the Code provision see Palmer, supra note 13,
at 274-75; Leary, "Some Clarifications in the Law of Commercial Paper Under the Pro-
posed Uniform Commercial Code," 97 U. Pa. L. Rev. 354, 380-81 (1949). This problem
was one of those involved in an earlier discussion of proposed changes to the N.I.L. See
Turner, "Revision of the Negotiable Instruments Law," 38 Yale L.J. 25, 34-37 (1928);
Turner, "A Factual Analysis of Certain Proposed Amendments to the Negotiable Instruments
Law," 38 Yale LJ. 1047, 1050-53 (1929).
63 1956 Recommendations, supra note 32, at 99; 1956 Law Revision Comm'n Rep. 406
(app. IV); 1955 Law Revision Comm'n Rep. 866-68.
64 UCC § 3-205. Restrictive Indorsements.
An indorsement is restrictive which either
(a) is conditional; or
(b) purports to prohibit further transfer of the instrument; or
(c) includes the words "for collection," "for deposit," "pay any bank," or like terms
signifying a purpose of deposit or collection; or
(d) otherwise states that it is for the benefit or use of the indorser or of another
person.
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and trust indorsements separately. 5 The major change from the N.I.L.
is the reversal of the rule inferred from N.I.L. section 4 7 ,61 that an instru-
ment once restrictively indorsed can no longer be negotiated.67 In the
case of collection indorsements, the Code provision recognizes the un-
reasonableness of imposing restrictions upon banks in the chain of col-
lection after the first bank taker. Accordingly the present law is reversed
as to intermediary banks in the collection process;'S such intermediary
banks are neither given notice nor otherwise affected by the restrictive
indorsement. 69 Similarly whereas the first taker under a trust indorse-
ment is bound to apply any value given by him for or on the security
of an instrument consistently with the indorsement, a later holder for
value is neither given notice nor otherwise affected by the restrictive
indorsement unless he has knowledge of a breach of trust.70
Part 3: Rights of a Holder
Generally, the treatment of the holder and the holder in due
course follows the scheme of the N.I.L. and utilizes the same or similar
terminology. The definition of "holder in due course" 7' enlarges upon
N.I.L. section 5272 by incorporating generally accepted decisional law
See Brady, Bank Checks 95-101 (Bailey 3rd ed. 1962), reprinted from 78 Banking L.J. 193-
99 (1961).
65 Compare subsection (a) and (c) with subsection (d) in § 3-205, supra note 64. This
permits separate treatment of the two types of indorsement in § 3-206 as to the effect of
restrictive indorsements. See Hawkland, Commercial Paper 110-11 (1959).
66 N.I.L. § 47 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 77). Continuation of negotiable character.
An instrument negotiable in its origin continues to be negotiable until it has been
restrictively indorsed or discharged by payment or otherwise.
See also N.I.L. §§ 36, 37 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law §§ 66, 67).
67 See Chafee, "Remarks on Restrictive Indorsements," 58 Harv. L. Rev. 1182, 1186, 1193
(1945); Leary, supra note 62, at 381-87 (commenting on the treatment of restrictive in-
dorsements in the 1952 draft of the UCC); Note, 52 Yale L.J. 890 (1943).
68 Soma v. Handrulis, 277 N.Y. 223, 14 N.E.2d 46 (1938) (intermediary bank held ac-
countable on a check indorsed "for deposit").
69 UCC § 3-206(2).
70 UCC § 3-206(4).
71 UCC § 3-302. Holder in Due Course.
(1) A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument
(a) for value; and
(b) in good faith; and
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense
against or claim to it on the part of any person.
(2) A payee may be a holder in due course.
(3) A holder does not become a holder in due course of an instrument:
(a) by purchase of it at judicial sale or by taking it under legal process; or
(b) by acquiring it in taking over an estate; or
(c) by purchasing it as part of a bulk transaction not in regular course of business
of the transferor.
(4) A purchaser of a limited interest can be a holder in due course only to the extent
of the interest purchased.
72 N.I.L. § 52 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 91). What constitutes a holder in due course.
A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument under the following
conditions:
1. That it is complete and regular upon its face;
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rules.73 Paralleling the format of the N.I.L., the section on holders in due
course is followed by separate sections elaborating upon value and notice.74
These latter sections, and the section dealing with burden of proof,
warrant some discussion.
A. Value (3-303)
The Code provision defining value accords generally with present
statutory and decisional law.75 Although the N.I.L. rule, equating value
with "any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract, ' 76 is
carried forward by the Code provision, the new language spells out the
distinction between consideration and. value.77 - The Code requires that
the agreed consideration shall actually have been given. 7  In accord
with present law, an antecedent debt may constitute value.79  Under
present decisional law, although an executory promise is sufficient con-
sideration to support an obligation embodied in an instrument, 0 such a
promise does not constitiute value so as to qualify a-transferee as a holder
in due course.81 Also to be noted is the article 4 section on bank credit
as value.82 This section permits a bank giving "credit available for
withdrawal.., whether or not the credit is drawn upon" to qualify as a
holder in due course to the extent of th6 credit given.
The Code definition of value also includes the giving of a negotiable
instrument. 83 Although this accords with the rule in some jurisdictions,84
2. That he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and without notice that
had been previously dishonored, if such was the fact;
3. That he took it in good faith and for value;
4. That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity in
the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it.
73 See UCC § 3-302(2), (3), (4), and Hogan & Penney, "Annotations of the Uniform
Commercial Code to the Statutory and Decisional Law of New York State," New York
Annotations to Uniform Commercial Code and Report of Commission on Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 110-11 (N.Y. Comm'n on Uniform State Laws 1961); Palmer, "Negotiable
Instruments Under the Uniform Commercial Code," 48 Mich. L. Rev. 255, 276-78 (1950);
Hawkland, supra note 65, at 78 (1959).
74 See UCC §§ 3-303, 3-304, respectively.
75 N.I.L. §§ 25, 26, 27, 54 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law §§ 51, 52, 53, 93 respectively);
Hogan & Penney, supra note 73, at 111-12; Britton, "Holder in Due Course-A Comparison
of the Provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law With Those of Article 3 of the
Proposed Uniform Commercial Code," 49 Nw. U.L. Rev. 417, 418-21 (1954). Cosway, supra
note 57, at 301; Palmer, supra note 73, at 278-79.
76 N.I.L. § 25 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 51).
7 UCC § 3-303(a) and comment 2.
78 UCC § 3-303(a).
79 Compare UCC § 3-303(a) and (b) with N.I.L. §§ 25, 54 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law
§§ 51, 93).
80 Finberg v. DeGoode, 199 App. Div. 177, 191 N.Y. Supp. 390 (2d Dep't 1921).
81 Citizens' State Bank v. Cowles, 180 N.Y. 346, 73 N.E. 33 (1905). For a full discussion
of "value" and "consideration" under the N.I.L. and citations to cases in other jurisdictions,
see Britton, Handbook of the Law of Bills and Notes at 211-44 (2d ed. 1961).
82 UCC § 4-209. See also UCC §§ 1-201(44) (a), 4-208. See Britton, supra note 81, at 235;
Note, 57 Yale L.J. 1419 (1948).
88 UCC § 3-303(c).
84 See cases cited in Britton, supra note 81, at 241-42; Annot., 69 A.L.R. 408, 409-12
(1930).
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others require that the instrument given pass into the hands of a bona
fide holder or be paid. 5
B. Notice and Good Faith (3-304)
The Code continues the present rule that to qualify as a holder in
due course the holder must take the paper in good faith. 6 The Code
presently contains a perplexing definition of the term "good faith. 87
What does "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned"
mean in the purchase of a note or the cashing of a check by a bank?
The removal of the language enlarging upon the "good faith" requirement
in the 1952 draft was intended to make clear the retention of the sub-
jective standard of good faith in article 3.18 The objective standard,
exemplified by the case of Gill v. Cubitt, 9 was clearly rejected in the
1956 Recommendations." Notwithstanding the rationale of the drafts-
men, the term "honesty in fact" promises to tantalize lawyers and judges
attempting to define "honesty" in the commercial paper context. This
85 Ibid.
Although no case has been found directly on point, New York has been cited as among
those jurisdictions which do not regard the giving of a negotiable instrument in exchange
for another as the giving of-value so as to constitute either party to the exchange a
holder in due course. It is further stated that where the instrument passes into the hands
of a bona fide holder or is paid, the holder of the other instrument will nevertheless be
recognized as a holder in due course. See Annot., 69 A.L.R. 408, 412 (1930), citing Mayer v.
Heidelbach, 123 N.Y. 332, 25 N.E. 416 (1890); Bacon v. Holloway, 2 E.D. Smith 159
68 ALR 408, 412 (1853); Baruch v. Buckley, 167 App. Div. 113, 151 N.Y. Supp. 853 (1st
Dep't 1915). These and other cases, however, all appear to be distinguishable on the point
at issue. If, however, a transfer to a bona fide holder or payment is required in New York,
this subparagraph will change the rule.
86 UCC § 3-302(1)(b). See note 70, supra. For general discussion see Brady, supra
note 64, at 119-28, reprinted from 78 Banking LJ. 461, 463-72 (1961).
87 UCC § 1-201. General Definitions.
Subject to additional definitions contained in the subsequent Articles of this Act which
are applicable to specific Articles or Parts thereof, and unless the context otherwise
requires, in this Act:
(19) "good faith" means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.
See Braucher, "The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code," 58 Colum. L.
Rev. 798, 812-14 (1958); Note, 23 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 754 (1962) (remarking upon the variety
of uses of the term in different parts of the Code and suggesting that the courts will have
to furnish definitions on a case by case basis).
88 1956 Recommendations, supra note 32, at 102-03. An excellent analysis of the concepts
of "good faith" and "bad faith" in the law of negotiable instruments may be found in 1955
Law Revision Comm'n Rep. 903-07. See also Britton, supra note 81, at 244-49; Britton,
supra note 75, at 430-32; Palmer, supra note 73, at 279-82.
89 3 B. & C. 466, 107 Eng. Rep. 806 (K.B. 1824), discussed in Britton, supra note 81, at
244-46.
90 1956 Recommendations, supra note 32, at 102-03. The Code leaves the doctrine of
"forgotten notice" expressly untouched. See § 1-201(25) ("The time and circumstances
under which a notice or notification may cease to be effective are not determined by this
Act."). The New York Court of Appeals recently refused to permit a bank to escape
liability on the basis of the doctrine in a rather exceptional fact situation. First Nat'l
Bank v. Fazzari, 10 N.Y.2d 394, 179 N.E.2d'493, 223 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1961), 26 Albany L.
Rev. 344 (1962); 47 Cornell L.Q. 670 (1962); 8 N.Y.L.F. 339 (1962); 42 B.U.L. Rev. 388
(1962).
Compare UCC § 1-201(25) and (27), with Restatement (Second), Agency §§ 268, 272,
278 (1958).
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would seem particularly difficult in applying the term to a financial
institution.
Lawyers should be particularly aware of the New York amendment.
to this Code section on notice." Added was a subsection continuing the
"bad faith" test of notice, found in N.I.L. section 56,92 but abandoned
by the Code draftsmen. The same New York subsection contains a spe-
cial rule concerning the qualification of organizations as holders in due
course. If such an organization acting as purchaser maintains "reasonable
routines for communicating significant information," it is chargeable
with knowledge only when the individual conducting the transaction on
its behalf has knowledge. This patchwork amendment seems destined
to cause difficulty.9 3
Although "good faith" has been, and is in the Code, combined with
the requirement that paper be taken without notice of defects, the latter
requirement is spelled out in a separate subparagraph of the Code defi-
nition of a "holder in due course"; 9 4 a separate hurdle is therefore pre-
sented. A new and elaborate section has been drafted to combine and
restate the various rules on notice to a purchaser presently reflected in
a series of N.I.L. sections and common law rules.95 These rules are
continued with very few changes. The continuance of the N.I.L. rule,
in somewhat liberalized form, that only a person taking complete and
regular paper may qualify as a holder in due course has been greaty
criticized.9 6 Particularly questioned has been the continuation of the
91 N.Y. Sess. Laws, ch. 553, § 3-304 (effective Sept. 27, 1964):
(7) In any event, to constitute notice of a claim or defense, the purchaser must have
knowledge of the claim or defense or knowledge of such facts that his action in
taking the instrument amounts to bad faith. If the purchaser is an organization
and maintains within the organization reasonable routines for communicating
significant information to the appropriate part of the organization apparently
concerned, the individual conducting the transaction on behalf of the purchaser
must have the knowledge.
See discussion of this variation in Penney, "New York Revisits the Code-Some Variations
in the New York Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code," 62 Colum. L. Rev. 992,
998-1000 (1962). A corresponding New York variation for investment securities may be
found in N.Y. Sess. Laws, ch. 553, § 8-304(3) (effective Sept. 24, 1964).
92 N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 95. This section is discussed by Professor Pasley in his
Analysis of Section 3-302(1), 1955 Law Revision Comm'n Rep. 903-07.
The remainder of N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 95, peculiar to New York, relating to
the drawing, making, endorsing, cashing, or depositing of corporate checks by or to corporate
officers or agents, has been transferred to N.Y. Banking Law § 9. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962,
ch. 552.
93 This amendment, prompted by t'e criticisms of the New York Clearing House Assod-
ation, originated as a suggestion that UCC § 1-201(25) and (27) be amended. Penney,
supra note 91, at 998-99. Amendments to article 1 were apparently avoided because of
the possibility of broad ramifications throughout the Code. The writer understands, how-
ever, that the New York variations have prompted renewed discussion of amending UCC
§ 1-201(27) using much of the language as added to §§ 3-304 and 8-304 in New York,
but with some changes designed to meet criticisms of the New York legislation.
94 See subsections (1) (b) and (c) UCC § 3-302, quoted in note 71, supra.
95 UCC § 3-304. See Hogan and Penney, supra note 73, at 112-14.
96 Compare UCC §§ 3-302(1) (c), 3-304(1) (a) with N.I.L. § 52(1) (N.Y. Negotiable Instr.
Law § 91(1)). See criticism in Hawkland, supra note 65, at 81-82; Britton, supra note 75,
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rule depriving a purchaser of his position as a holder in due course not
only with respect to defenses and claims associated with the incom-
pleteness or alteration, but also as to defenses and claims having nothing
to do with these "defects."97 By way of rebuttal, to require a prudent
purchaser to question virtually every aspect of visibly altered paper does
not seem too unreasonable.
A specific subparagraph of the Code section on notice furnishes rules
for determining when a purchaser has notice that an instrument is
overdue.0 1. Notice that paper is overdue disqualifies the purchaser as a
holder in due course.99 Under present case law, a purchaser after ma-
turity may not qualify as a holder in due course, and although maturity
may be subject to acceleration, the absence of knowledge of the fact of
acceleration is of no consequence.10 Under the Code, that paper is over-
due in fact does not prevent a person from qualifying as a holder in due
course, but rather reason to know that the instrument is overdue either
as to any part of the principal 6kr by reason of acceleration is sufficient
notice.' 01 I I
Among the N.I.L. sections dealing with the holder in due course, the
"stale check" section,0 2 disqualifying persons taking demand instruments
"an unreasonable time after issue," has long been difficult to interpret.
A "reasonable time" has varied with circumstances and the character of
the instrument.0 3 Even with the check there has been great difficulty
in fixing the time period. Presently the period is somewhere between
eleven days1 4 and twenty-seven months.'0 5 The Code provides some
certainty by creating a presumption that a domestic check thirty days
old is stale.'
C. Burden of Proof (3-307)
The Code section governing the burden of establishing signatures, de-
fenses and due course holding, is essentially a restatement of N.I.L. section
at 433-35. See also Brady, supra note 64, at 128, reprinted from 78 Banking LJ. 461, 472
(1961).
97 See Britton, supra note 75, at 433-35.
98 UCC § 3-304(3). See Brady, supra note 64, at 129, reprinted from 78 Banking LJ.
461, 473 (1961).
99 UCc § 3-302(1) (c).
100 Northhampton Natl Bank v. Kidder, 106 N.Y. 221, 12 N. 577 (1887). For discus-
sion of this problem, see Britton, supra note 75, at 424-26.
101 UCC § 3-304(3) (a), (b).--
102 N.I.L. § 53 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 92).
103 N .IL. § 193 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 4). For citations to cases, see Britton,
supra note 81, at 303-05; Annots., 23 A.L.R. 1205 (1923); 60 A.L.R. 649 (1929).
104 Springer v. Erdman, 125 Misc. 112, 210 N.Y. Supp. 224 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 1st Dep't
1925).
105 Goldberg v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 199 Misc. 167, 102 N.Y.S.2d 144 (N.Y. Munic.
Ct. 1951).
100 UCC § 3-304(3)(c). "A reasonable time for a check drawn and payable within the
states and territories of the United States and the District of Columbia is presumed to be
thirty days." See also UCC § 4-406 and text following note 347, infra.
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59.107 Some clarification and minor changes for the better are accom-
plished. The Code18 reverses the common law rule permitting presen-
tation of evidence as to circumstances attending the alleged making of
notes sued upon under a general denial.109 In addition the Code provides
that any defense shifts the burden of proof."0 The shifting of the burden
where want of consideration is shown reverses the present rule."' The
expression "it is shown that" in subsection 3-307(3) was reinstated
between the 1952 draft and the 1956 Recommendations to continue the
law interpreting N.I.L. section 59 and to make clear that no change in
the quantum of evidence was intended." 2 The Code provision has been
praised for its comprehensiveness, clearer diction, better organization
and the anticipation and resolution of many questions." 3
" Part 4: Liability of Parties
A. General Statement
Part 4 contains substantial material not found ir the Negotiable In-
struments Law; new provisions are found with respect to impostors," 4
the contract of guarantor,"' the warranties on presentment and trans-
fer, 116 and the conversion of negotiable instruments." 7 In addition this
part clarifies several problems arising under present law and makes sev-
eral policy changes in N.I.L. rules.
B. Signatures (3-403, -404)
The Code includes "other representatives" with agents able to bind
others by their signatures." 8 In view of the case law including a wide
variety of representatives within the meaning of the term agent," 9 prob-
ably no change in the present law is made.
107 N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 98.
108 UCC § 3-307(1).
109 Hoffstaedter v. Carlton Auto Supplies Co., 203 App. Div. 494, 196 N.Y. Supp. 577 (1st
Dep't 1922). Cf. N.Y.C. Municipal Court Code § 92. On the burden of proof in negotiable
instruments cases generally, see Britton, supra note 81, at 249-69; Britton, supra note 75,
at 446-50.
110 UCC § 3-307(3). See Cosway, "Innovations in Articles Three and Four of the
Uniform Commercial Code," 16 Law & Contemp. Prob. 284, 289-90 (1951) ; Note, 10 Mercer
L. Rev. 211 (1958).
111 Mitchell v. Baldwin, 88 App. Div. 265, 84 N.Y.S. 1043, (3d Dep't 1903).
112 1956 Recommendations, supra note 32, at 107.
118 Carrington, "Banking, Commercial Paper and Investment Securities Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code," 14 Wyo. LJ. 198, 204-05 (1960).
114 UCC § 3-405.
115 UCC § 3-416.
116 UCC § 3-417.
117 UCC § 3-419.
118 UCC § 3-403(1).
119 See, e.g., Megowan v. Peterson, 173 N.Y. 1, 65 N.E. 738 (1902) ("trustee" for
creditors); Hellawell v. Garrett Busch & Son, Inc., 157 Misc. 805, 285 N.Y. Supp. 717 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau County), modified, 248 App. Div. 737, 290 N.Y. Supp. 143 (2d Dep't 1936)
(executrix). See also N.I.L. § 20 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 39), referring to the con-
sequences of signing "for or on behalf of a principal, or in a representative capacity."
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As the Official Comments indicate, 120 the Code adopts the majority
view admitting parol evidence against a payee to show that a signature
was written in a representative capacity where the name of the person
represented is disclosed but the fact of representation is not stated. 21
Also adopted is the New York and minority view admitting parol evi-
dence for this purpose where the fact of representation is disclosed but
not the name of the principal. 22 The 1952 draft was different on both
of these points; the present language first appeared in the 1956 Recom-
mendations in response to criticism from the New York Law Revision
Commission. 23
The Code adopts the rule of New Georgia Nat'l Bank v. J. & G.
Lippmann 24 in rendering an unauthorized signature binding on the un-
authorized signer in favor of any person who in good faith pays the
instrument or takes for value. The Code seems to extend the rule of
the Lippmann case to forgery as well.125
C. Impostors and Fictitious Payees (3-405)
The Code takes an entirely fresh approach in dealing with the problem
of impostors and fictitious payees. Under common law'12  and the
N.T.L.,J2 7 paper knowingly made payable to the order of a fictitious
person by the drawer is deemed bearer paper and is capable of negoti-
ation by delivery alone. The impostor case is not treated under the N.I.L.
Under common law rules, however, where the "intent" of the drawer to
make the instrument payable to the impostor is established, an instru-
ment is deemed payable to the order of the impostor and able to be
endorsed by him in his assumed name. 28 New York has been more strict
than other jurisdictions in requiring a prior course of face-to-face deal-
120 UCC § 3-403, comment 3.
121 Central Bank v. Gleason, 206 App. Div. 28, 200 N.Y. Supp. 384 (4th Dep't 1923); Hoff-
staedter v. Carlton Auto Supplies Co., 203 App. Div. 494, 196 N.Y. Supp. 577 (1st Dep't
1922). For cases in other jurisdictions see Britton, supra note 81, at 487-88, n.4.
122 Megowan v. Peterson, 173 N.Y. 1, 5, 65 N.E. 738, 739 (1902), noted 3 Colum. L. Rev.
211 (1903). See UCC § 3-403(2) (b). For cases in other jurisdictions, predominantly *contra,
see Britton, supra note 81, at 487, nn.1, 2. See also Whitney, Modern Commercial Practices
395-403 (1958) (apparently commenting upon the 1952 text which differed on these points).
123 1956 Recommendations, supra note 32, at 107-08; 1956 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n
Rep. 408-09; 1955 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n in Rep. 985-94.
124 249 N.Y. 307, 164 N.E. 108 (1928).
125 UCC § 3-404(1). See Beutel, "Comparison of the Proposed Commercial Code,
Article 3, and the Negotiable Instruments Law," 30 Neb. L. Rev. 531, 552-53 (1951).
126 Britton, supra note 81, at 425-40.
127 NJ.L. § 9(3) (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 28(3)).
128 Abel, "The Impostor Payee: or, Rhode Island Was Right," (pts. 1 and 2). 1940 Wis.
L. Rev. 161, 362; Aigler, "When is a Payee an 'Imposter'?" 2 Ariz. L. Rev. 78 (1960).
See also Britton, supra note 81, at 440-47; Palmer, "Negotiable Instruments Under the
Uniform Commercial Code," 48 Mich. L. Rev. 255, 284-88. For collection of cases, Annot.,
81 A.L.R.2d 1365 (1962).
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ings to identify the impostor as the object of the transferor's dominant
intent.129
When organizations are involved as drawers the problem is further
compounded. Two patterns are common in this context: first, a fraudu-
lent agent, authorized to draw checks in the name of his employer, issues
checks to "dummy" payees, intending to obtain the proceeds; second,
the fraudulent agent who has no authority to draw checks supplies names
to another agent who draws the checks in reliance on the names sub-
mitted.3 ° In the first case, the loss is placed on the drawer where proper
authority for the agent can be shown.3 ' In the second, sometimes called
the "padded payroll" case, the innocent drawee bank almost always bears
the loss.832 The "fictitious" character of the payee is unknown to the
person technically labelled as the drawer and the "impostor rule" often
does not apply. In an effort to meet these problems, several states have
adopted the Uniform Fictitious Payee Act.'13  These statutes make an
instrument payable to bearer
"when it is payable to the order of a fictitious person, or a nonexisting
person, or an existing person not intended to have any interest in it, and
any such fact was known to the person making it so payable, or known
to his employee or other agent who supplied the name of such payee...
The statute reverses the common law rule which refused to charge the
maker with the larcenous knowledge of his employee." 4 The knowledge
of the fraudulent employee supplying the name of the fictitious person
is imputed to the employer-drawer.
The Code deals with both the impostor and fictitious payee problems in
the same section 3 5 and accomplishes substantially the same result as the
129 Cohen v. Lincoln Say. Bank, 275 N.Y. 399, 407-12, 10 N.E.2d 457, 461-63 (1937)
(prior course of dealings required for purpose of identifying imposter as object of trans-
feror's "dominant intent"). For cases requiring "face to face" dealings, see International
Aircraft Trading Co. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 297 N.Y. 285, 291, 79 N.E.2d 249, 251
(1948) (dicta); Halsey v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 270 N.Y. 134, 139, 200 N.E. 671,
673 (1936); American Sur. Co. v. Empire Trust Co., 262 N.Y. 181, 186 N.E. 436 (1933);
Mercantile Natl Bank v. Silverman, 148 App. Div. 1, 132 N.Y.S. 1017 (1st Dep't 1911), aff'd
mem., 210 N.Y. 567, 104 N.E. 1134 (1914).
180 These two types of cases are discussed and analyzed in Britton, "Defenses, Claims
of Ownership and Equities-A Comparison of the Provisions of the Negotiable Instruments
Law with corresponding provisions of Article 3 of the proposed Commercial Code," 7
Hastings L.J. 1, 27-31 (1955). See also Hawkland, Commercial Paper 67-69 (1955); Farns-
worth, "Insurance Against Check Forgery," 60 Colum. L. Rev. 284, 305-09 (1960); Suther-
land, "Article 3-Logic, Experience and Negotiable Paper," 1952 Wis. L. Rev. 230, 241-45.
131 See Britton, Bills and Notes 429-32 (2d ed. 1961).
132 Id. at 432-34.
133 The amendment is at variance with N.I.L. § 9(3) and was adopted in 1960 as an
amendment to N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 28(3). For a list of other states that have
adopted the act, see 2 Paton, Digest 1867 (Supp. 1942). See also Note, 35 St. John's L.
Rev. 390 (1961).
134 See Britton; supra note 131 at 432-34; Swift & Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 280 N.Y.
135, 19 N.E.2d 992 (1939); City of N.Y. v. Bronx County Trust Co., 261 N.Y. 64, 184 N.E.
495 (1933).
135 Section 3-405. Impostors; Signature in Name of Payee.
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Uniform Fictitious Payee Act with some differences. First, rather than
require the indorsement of the impostor to characterize the paper as
bearer in form, the Code permits an effective indorsement by any person.
This comes very close to treating the paper as bearer in form. Indorse-
ment may apparently be supplied by a stranger to the fraud. Although
anyone can indorse, the Code requires that the instrument be issued to
either the impostor or his confederate in the name of a payee. Some dif-
ficulty may arise when a fraudulent scheme involves "issuance" to some
innocent person who is employed to deal with the drawer, unless that
person can be brought within the meaning of the term "confederate."M 36
No distinction is made as to imposture through the mails, thereby depart-
ing from the New York rule requiring face-to-face dealings.13  A prior
course of dealing to identify the impostor as the object of the transferor's
"dominant intent" is no longer required.
D. The Negligent Drawer and the Rule of Young v. Grote (3-406)
Adopting the rule of Young v. Grote,138 the common law of the United
States holds that the drawer of a check owes a duty to the drawee bank
not to act so carelessly as to contribute to alteration.'39 The rule has
been typically applied to penalize drawers who negligently leave blank
spaces. The Code extends the common law rule protecting drawee banks
in such cases to holders in-due cou-rs-e. The Law Revision Commission
successfully advocated the addition of a requirement that the drawee
pay the instrument in good faith and in accordance with reasonable
commercial standards to enjoy protection under this provision;' the
contributory negligence of a drawee will therefore defeat his rights. In
this instance the commercial banking group was understandably willing
to leave the "reasonable commercial standards test" in the Code. To be
considered in the context of the drawer's duties is section 4-406 of article
(1) An indorsement by aiy person in the name of a named payee is effective if
(a) an impostor by use of the mails or otherwise has induced the maker or
drawer to issue the instrument to him or his confederate in the name of the
payee; or
(b) a person signing as or on behalf of a maker or drawer intends the payee to
have no interest in the instrument; or
(c) an agent or employee of the maker or drawer has supplied him with the
name of the payee intending the latter to have no such interest.
136 Professor Farnsworth raises this question with the case of Russell v. Second Nat'l Bank,
136 N.J.L. 270, 55 A.2d 211 (Ct. Err. & App. 1947). Farnsworth, Cases on Negotiable
Instruments 212-13 (1959).
137 See note 129, supra.
138 4 Bing. 253, 130 Eng. Rep. 764 (C.P. 1827).
139 See Britton, supra note 131, at 662-70.
140 Under present law holders in due course have no recourse and are not protected as
to checks or other instruments negligently prepared by drawers or makers. National Exch.
Bank v. Lester, 194 N.Y. 461, 87 N.E. 779 (1909). For cases in other jurisdictions, see
Britton supra note 131, at 665 nn.6, 8, 9, at 666 n.10.
141 1956 Recommendations; supra note 32, at 109; 1956 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n Rep.
409; 1955 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n Rep. 1009-13. See also Britton, supra note 130, at.
18-20; Sutherland, supra note 130, at 245-48.
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4 spelling out the drawer's duty to examine his return vouchers or
statements .
142
E. Alterations (3-407)
Under present law any alteration, even one innocently made, avoids
the instrument. 43 No exception is made for alterations made by strangers,
sometimes described as spoliation; nor is any distinction made for the
nonfraudulent but material alteration. 4 The Code codifies some of the
decisional law145 anieliorating the harshness of the N.I.L. provision;
under the Code no alteration discharges any party unless made by the
holder and unless it is both fraudulent and material'.146 Spoliation does
not "avoid" the instrument. 47 The Code continues the N.IL. rule per-
mitting a subsequent holder in due course in every instance to enforce
the instrument according to its original tenor. 148 As to instruments
completed after leaving the hands of the drawer, a holder in due course
may enforce the instrument as completed.'49
F. Acceptance (3-410, -411, -412)
A series of minor changes is made in three sections dealing with accept-
ance and certification. The Code requires that the acceptance be on the
draft, 15 thereby eliminating the collateral, which includes both the
virtual or extrinsic, acceptance.' 51 The Code abandons any distinction
between the various kinds of qualified acceptances found in the N.I.L.15 -
The constructive acceptance arising from N.I.L. sections 136 and 137
is abandoned.153 The rule of Wachtel v. Rosen,1'4 denying any obligation
142 See text following note 358, infra.
'43 N..L. §§ 124, 125 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law §§ 205, 206).
144 Brady, Bank Checks 444-46 (Bailey ed. 1962).
145 See Britton, supra note 131 at 660-61.
146 UCC § 3-407(2). Accord as to alteration by a stranger, see Gleason v. Hamilton,
138 N.Y. 353, 34 N.E. 283 (1893) (alteration of a mortgage). As to "fraudulent" alterations
see Booth v. Powers, 56 N.Y. 22, 29-30 (1874); Oltarsh v. Turf Broadway, Inc., 12 Misc.
2d 984, 986, 175 N.Y.S.2d 714, 717 (N.Y. City Ct. 1958).
147 UCC § 3-407(2).
148 Compare UCC § 3-407(3), with N.I.L. § 124 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 205).
149 UCC § 3-407(3). The separate rule in N.I.L. § 15 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 34),
as to incomplete undelivered instruments is reversed. See also Linick v. A. 3. Nutting
& Co., 140 App. Div. 265, 125 N.Y. Supp. 93 (2d Dep't 1910); Holzman, Cohen & Co. v.
Teague, 172 App. Div. 75, 158 N.Y. Supp. 211 (1st Dep't 1916). See text following note
38, supra.
150 UCC § 3-410(1).
151 See N.I.L. H2 133, 134 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law §§ 221, 222). See discussion
in Britton, supra note 131, at 505-06; Palmer, supra note 128, at 289-90.
152 Compare UCC § 3-412(1) with N.I.L. § 141 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 229).
See also N.I.L. §§ 139, 140, 132. N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law §§ 220, 227, 228. See discussion
in Britton, supra note 131, at 503-04.
153 See N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law §§ 224, 225. The New York law on constructive
acceptance is unclear. Compare State Bank v. Weiss, 46 Misc. 93, 91 N.Y. Supp. 276 (Sup.
Ct. App. Term 1904), with Matteson v. Moulton, 79 N.Y. 627 (1880). See generally Britton
supra note 131, at 515-17.
154 249 N.Y. 386, 164 N.E. 326 (1928). See discussion in Britton, supra note 131, at
517-20.
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of banks to certify checks, has been codified. 55  Finally, the Code re-
quires that prior parties affirmatively assent to an acceptance varying the
terms of a draft; otherwise such prior parties are discharged.15 6
G. Accommodation Parties (3-415)
The official text of the Code imposes no warranty liability upon accom-
modation parties. 5 7 The liability "of such a party is determined by the
"capacity in which he has signed."' 5o The New York enactment of the
Code reverses this Code policy limiting warranty liability to vendors
and retains the'substance of the warranty obligation imposed in sections
65 and 66 of the N.I.L.1'59 The apparent purpose of the New York amend-
m6nt was to avoid the possible loss of immediate recourse when a
"breach" is discovered prior to the maturity of time paper.160
H. Warranties on Presentment and Transfer (3-417)
The Code imposes warranty liabilty in article 3 only upon those who
"obtain payment or acceptance," "prior transferors" and persons "who
transfer an instrument and receive consideration."'!6 Irregular indorsers
are thereby excluded as are accommodation parties, other than in New
York.162 The most notable change is the extension of warranties to good-
faith acceptors and payors 163 as well as to subsequent holders "who take
the instrument in good faith."' 6 Statutory warranty liability did not run
to payor banks under the N.I.L.165 although various common law theo-
ries166 and other devices' 67 were employed to accomplish the same end.
Paralleling the N.I.L. the Code provides for: warranties of title,"'
155 UCC § 3-411(2).
156 UCC § 3-412(3). Compare N.LL. § 142 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 230). See
Carrington, supra note 113, at 207.
'57 UCC § 3-417(2) discussed in Hawkland, supra note 130, at 61-62.
158 UCC § 3-415(2). See also §§ 3-413 (Contract of Maker, Drawer and Acceptor),
3-414 (Contract of Indorser), 3-416 (Contract of Guarantor).
159 N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law §§ 115, 116.
160 See Penney, "New York Revisits the Code: Some Variations in the New York Enact-
ment of the Uniform Commercial Code," 62 Colum. L. Rev. 992, 1000 (1962).
161 UCC § 3-417(1), (2). See also Aigler & Steinheimer, Cases on Bills and Notes 246
(1962).
162 See text following note 156, supra.
163 UCC § 3-417(1). See Leary, "Commercial Paper: Some Aspects of Article 3 of the
Uniform Commercial Code," 48 Ky. LJ. 198, 224-26 (1960).
164 UCC § 3-417(2). See Hawkland, supra note 130, at 62; Aigler & Steinheimer, supra
note 161, at 246.
165 See NJ.L. §§ 65, 66 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law §§ 115, 116).
166 See Franklin Square Nat'l Bank v. Great AtI. Bldg. Material Supply Corp., 186
Misc. 524, 526, 60 N.Y.S.2d 352, 353 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd mem., 270 App.
Div. 930, 62 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1st Dep't.), aff'd, 296 N.Y. 644, 69 N.E.2d 684 (1946) (dis-
cussion of varying theories of recovery).
167 Legal effect given to endorsement "pay any bank or banker" ABA Bank Collection
Code, § 4 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 350-c). See also Note, 40 Colum. L. Rev. 320 (1940).
168 UCC § 3-417(2)(a). Compare N.IL. § 65(2) (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 115(2))..
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against forged or unauthorized signatures,169 against material altera-
tion,1 70 against defenses, 171 and against insolvency proceedings. 2
I. Price v. Neal (3-418)
The rule of Price v. Neal,17 codified at least in part by N.I.L. section
62,174 provides, among other things, that money paid out by an innocent
drawee on an instrument bearing a forged signature of the drawer cannot
be recovered from an innocent purchaser. The rule is commonly regarded
as an exception to the rule that money paid out on a mutual mistake of
material fact is recoverable.175 N.I.L. section 62 does speak of the finality
of acceptance but says nothing about payment. Post-N.I.L. decisions
have either deemed this N.I.L. language to include payment or have
found other grounds for continuing to apply the rule of Price v. Neal to
payment. 176  The codification of the rule in the Code is found in two
sections: one provides that although persons presenting instruments for
payment or acceptance make certain warranties, the warranty as to the
genuineness of the drawer's signature is not made to a payor or
acceptor; 177 the other makes payment or acceptance final in favor of
holders in due course or persons who have in good faith changed their
position in reliance on the payment. 78
The common law contains certain exceptions to the doctrine. 7 9 The
drawee may recover from a presenter or cashing bank which acts in bad
faith or negligently. 8 ° The Code abandons the negligence exception.' 8 '
The effect of the bad faith rule is retained in part, however, by virtue of
the presentment warranty that the presenter has no knowledge that the
169 UCC § 3-417(2)(b). Compare N.I.L. § 65(1) (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 115(1)).
170 UCC § 3-417(2)(c). Compare N.I.L. § 65(1) (genuineness) (N.Y. Negotiable Instr.
Law § 115(1)).
'71 UCC § 3-417(2)(d). This seems to parallel the N.I.L. § 65(3) warranty that all
prior parties had capacity to contract and that the instrument is valid and subsisting. See
N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 115(3). See generally Brady, Bank Checks 114-115 (Bailey
ed. 1962) reprinted from 78 Banking LJ. 212-13 (1961).
172 UCC § 3-417(2) (e). This seems novel but compare N.I.L. § 65(4) (N.Y. Negotiable
Instr. Law § 115(4)). See also Britton, Bills and Notes 632 (2d ed. 1961).
173 3 Burr. 1354, 1 W. Bla. 390 (1762).
174 N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 112 (as to an acceptor).
175 See Britton, supra note 172, at 375.
176 Britton, supra note 172, at 380-82. Although there are several post-N.I.L. decisions
in New York applying the rule, none of them seems to deal with the applicability of NI.L.
§ 62 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 112). See Banca Commerciale Italiana Trust Co. v.
Clarkson, 274 N.Y. 69, 8 N.E.2d 281 (1937); Bergstrom v. Ritz-Carton Restaurant & Hotel
Co., 171 App. Div. 776, 157 N.Y. Supp. 959 (1st Dep't 1916); Williamsburgh Trust Co. v.
Turn Suden, 120 App. Div. 518, 105 N.Y. Supp. 335 (2d Dep't 1907). See also Comment, 13
Syracuse L. Rev. 426 (1962).
177 UCC §§ 3-417, and 3-417(1) (b). See discussion in text, following note 160, supra.
178 UCC § 3-418.. See Comment, 23 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 198 (1961).
179 See Britton, supra note 172, at 382; Comment, 13 Syracuse L. Rev. 426, 428 (1962).
180 See Bergstrom v. Ritz-Carlton Restaurant & Hotel Co., supra note 176.
181 UCC § 3-418, comment 4.
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signature of the maker or drawer is unauthorized. 82 The language at
the end of section 3-418, protecting a person who has in good faith
changed his. position in reliance on the payment, was inserted at the
insistence of the New York Law Revision Commission. 83 This appears
to codify the restitution rule denying recovery of a mistaken payment
where the payee has changed his position. 84
Section 3-418 is also notable in New York for its reversal of the
anomalous rule excepting certification from the doctrine of Price v.
Neal.185
Part 5: Presentment, Notice of Dishonor, and Protest
A. General
This part of the Code has involved the greatest paring down and sim-
plification of comparable material found in the N.I.L. Provisions con-
cerning presentment, notice of dishonor and protest, scattered throughout
twenty-seven sections of the N.I.L.,88 are compressed mainly into eleven
sections. 87  The archaic ant hardly ever used provisions concerning
acceptance and payment for honor found in seventeen sections of the
N.I.L. 8  are completely eliminated. Few major changes are made and,
generally, any notice or demand adequate under existing law is sufficient
under the Code. 8 9
B. Delay in Presentment (3-501, -502)
In applying sanctions for delay, the Code takes a new approach.
Although the indorser continues to be completely discharged, 99 any
drawer or acceptor suffering a loss on a draft payable at a bank because
of a bank failure during the period of the delay may discharge his lia-
bility by assigning his rights against the failed bank.' 9 ' The Code con-
182 UCC § 3-417(1)(b).
183 1956 Recommendations, supra note 32, at 116; 1956 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n
Rep. 411; 1955 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n Rep. 1072-79.
184 Restatement, Restitution §§ 69, 142-43 (1937). See also Palmer, "Negotiable Instru-
ments Underthe Uniform Commercial Code, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 255, 276 (1950).
185 See Mefropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of United States, 259 N.Y. 365, 182 N.E. 18
(1932), 46 Harv. L. Rev. 151 (1932) (critical). See Comment, 13 Syracuse L. Rev. 426, 430
(1962). New York is not alone in treating certification as an exception to Price v. Neal.
See Britton, supra note 172, at 390.
186 N.I.L. §§ 70-118, 143-60. (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law §§ 130-48, 160-89, 240-48,
260-68.)
187 UCC §§ 3-501 to 511.
188 N.I.L. §§ 161-77 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law §§ 280-89, 300-06).
189 Carrington, "Banking, Commercial Paper and Investment Securities Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code," 14 Wyo. L.J. 198, 208 (1960). See general discussion in Hawk-
land, Commercial Paper 38-60 (1959).
190 Compare UCC §§ 3-501(1)(b), 3-502(1)(a), with N.I.L. §§ 70, 89, 144 (N.Y.
Negotiable Instr. Law §§ 130, 160, 241).
19' UCC § 3-502 (1) (b). See discussion in Sutherland, "Article 3-Logic, Experience and
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tinues the "reasonable time"- measure of timely presentment 92 but adds
certain presumptions for domestic uncertified checks. In substitution
for the current "one day rule,' 93 the Code requires that a check be
presented within thirty days to hold the drawer'94 and within seven days
from the date of the indorsement to hold an indorsor.'95 Proving the
dates of indorsements, however, may be difficult.
These presumptions have caused a great deal of controversy. The
bankers of the City of New York have argued vehemently that these
periods are both too short for checks sent abroad and then returned to
the United States for presentment and too long for many purely domestic
transactions. 196 Since article 1 clearly provides that the presumptions
shall fall when evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding of
the nonexistence of such presumptions, 197 the concern of the bankers
would seem unfounded. The certainty afforded appears to overshadow
potential shortcomings. The Code provision has the virtue of eliminating
the discredited and somewhat anomalous N.I.L. interpretation found in
the case of Columbian Banking Co. v. Bowen.'98 This case, requiring only
that a check be presented promptly after the "last negotiation," demon-
strates the unfairness to a first indorsor whose liability is unreasonably
prolonged by a second indorsor's extended holding of an instrument be-
fore further negotiation. Under the Code each party's liability is meas-
./ ured from the date of his handling of the instrument.199
As mentioned above, the Code also furnishes a neat solution to the
practical problem encountered in a suit against the drawer of a check
during the pendency of the drawee's liquidation proceedings. The assign-
ment of the drawer's claim against the drawee 09 avoids the problem of
awaiting the termination of the proceeding to determine the extent of
the loss. A further gain is reflected in the Code's uniform treatment of
the drawer of a check, the drawer of a bill of exchange other than a
Negotiable Paper," 1952 Wis. L. Rev. 230, 248-51. Palmer, supra note 184, at 301-03; Brady,
supra note 171, at 262-64, reprinted from 78 Banking L.j. 461, 679-81.
192 Compare UCC § 3-503(2) (first sentence) with N.IL. § 193 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr.
Law § 4).
193 Brady, supra note 171, at 250. There seems to be little or no clear New York law
on point. See 1955 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n Rep. 1097.
194 UCC § 3-503(2)(a).
195 UCC § 3-503(2)(b).
196 New York Clearing House Ass'n, Report on the Uniform Commercial Code 20, item 8,
(1961). Further discussion of this report may be found in Penney, supra note 160.
197 UCC § 1-201(31).
198 134 Wis. 218, 114 N.W. 451 (1908), discussed in Morris, "The Importance of Promptly
Presenting Checks for Payment," 61 W. Va. L. Rev. 191, 191-99 (1959) and Palmer, supra
note 184, at 301-03. See also Delony, "The Presentment Problem in the Collection of
Checks Through Banks," 10 U. Fla. L. Rev. 382, 397 (1957).
199 UCC § 3-503(2) (a), (b).
200 UCC § 3-502(1)(b). See references in note 191, supra.
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check and the maker of a note payable at a bank2. in delayed present-
ment cases. Under the N.I.L. the drawer of a check is discharged to the
extent of his loss; 20 2 the drawer of a bill of exchange other than a check
is discharged fully; 203 and the maker of a note payable at a bank is not
discharged at all °4
Part 6: Discharge
A. General (3-601)
The Code takes a new approach to the concept of discharge. Dis-
charge is clearly established as a personal defense unavailable against a
subsequent holder in due course without notice.205 The methods of dis-
charge are collected in the first section of this part and generally reflect
present N.I.L. or decisional rules.206 The Code departs from the approach
taken by the N.I.L. in providing for the discharge of some or all of the
parties to an instrument rather than the discharge of the instrument
itself.20 7 Abandoned is the N.I.L. scheme that "payment in due course"
discharges the payor lacking notice of a defect in the holder's title.0
The Code substitutes a provision permitting the 'discharge of a paying
party who knows of an outstanding claim unless the claimant follows
the "adverse claim" procedure specified.2 0 9 The claimant is required
either to secure an injunction against payinent or post security to protect
the payor. Under present law a payor with knowledge of an adverse
claim is on the horns of a dilemma; he risks liability whether he pays
or not.
B. Suretyship (3-606)
The Code extends the application of suretyship principles to accom-
modation makers and drawers as well as indorsors. Because of the lan-
guage in N.I.L. section 120210 specifying that the extension of the time
of payment operates to discharge secondary parties, most courts have
held that such an extension is no defense to an accommodation party who
201 U.C.C. § 3-502(1) (b).
202 NI.L. § 186 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 322).
203 N.I.L. § 70 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 130)
204 Ibid.
205 See UCC § 3-602.
206 See UCC § 3-601 and the annotations to the other sections of the Code to which
cross reference is made in that section in Hogan & Penney, New York Annotations to Uni-
form Commercial Code (1961).
207 Compare UCC § 3-601 with N.I.L. §§ 119, 120, 121 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law
§§ 200, 201, 202).
208 N.I.L. § 119(1), (2) (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 200(1), (2)). See also NI.L.
§§ 51, 88 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law §§ 90, 148).
209 UCC § 3-603. Compare N.Y. Banking Law §§ 134 (5), (6), (7); 171 (5), (6),
(7) ; 239 (5), (6) ("adverse claim" statutes as to banks or trust companies, private bankers,
and savings banks). See Comment, 65 Yale L.J. 807, 810-16 (1956).
210 N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 201.
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appears as maker or drawer on the instrument."' This is because such
a party is primarily, not secondarily, liable "on the instrument.1 212 The
Code rejects this anomalous result.2 1 3 The New York Law Revision
Commission successfully persuaded the Code draftsmen to modify this
section in the 1956 Recommendations so as to extend the defense of
release of principal to principals bound otherwise than on the instru-
ment.214 In addition to extension of the time of payment and release of
principal defenses, section 3-606 codifies a suretyship rule bdischarging
any nonconsenting party to the instrument when the holder "unjusti-
fiably impairs . . .collateral .... ,21 All of these suretyship principles
are made applicable to primary as well as secondary parties.
Several semantic problems, however, are posed by this suretyship sec-
tion. First, what changes are wrought by the Code's use of the phrase
"agrees not to sue" in describing grounds for discharge is not clear.218
If the equivalent of a covenant not to sue, this provision appears to re-
verse the present majority rule.217 Second, the effect of the Code's omit-
ting the term "binding" to modify "agreement," found in the comparable
section of the N.I.L., is uncertain.21 Under present law the agreement
must be binding; forebearance is not sufficient.21 Third, does release
of collateral to the accommodated party discharge the surety under the
Code? The Code provision only speaks of "unjustifiably impair[ing]
any collateral for the instrument given.1 220 Any uncertainty here can
be remedied by redrafting.221
Part 7: Advice of International Sight Draft (3-701)
Part 7 of the 1952 draft of article 3 included the provisions on col-
lection of documentary drafts now found in part 5 of article 4. The
New York Law Revision Commission vigorously criticized the location
211 Britton, supra note 172, at 698-705.
212 See criticism in Palmer, supra note 184, at 305-06 (written prior to the incorporation
of this provision in the Code).
213 "Any party to the instrument" is discharged. See UCC § 3-606(1).
214 1956 Recommendations, supra note 32, at 129.
215 UCC § 3-606(1) (b). Accord, Exchange Bank v. Ludlum, 246 App. Div. 892, 285
N.Y. Supp. 862 (4th Dep't 1936) (release of collateral); Cohen v. Rossmoore, 225 App. Div.
300, 233 N.Y. Supp. 196 (1st Dep't 1929) (release of collateral). But see text following
note 219, infra.
216 UCC § 3-606(1) (a).
217 Britton, supra note 172, at 682, n.1. Contra and in accord with the Code, see Brown v.
Williams, 4 Wend. 360 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830). See 1955 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n Rep.
1177.
218 Compare N.I.L. § 120(6) (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 201(6)) with UCC
§ 3-606(1) (a).
219 People's Nat'l Bank v. Hewitt, 226 App. Div. 412, 235 N.Y. Supp. 392 (3d Dep't
1929), aff'd, 253 N.Y. 523, 171 N.E. 765 (1930). See also 1955 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n
Rep. 1179 (analysis of UCC § 3-606).
220 UCC § 3-606(1)(b).
221 Memorandum of Professor William F. Starr to New York Commission on Uniform
State Laws, January 17, 1962.
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of these provisions in article 3 and conditioned approval of them on
their being moved to article 4. 222 To avoid the inconvenience of renum-
bering the rest of article 3, former section 3-806 was transferred to be-
come the new section 3-701.223 This novel section, purporting to codify
current banking practice with respect to letters of advice of international
sight drafts,224 was amended in New York by eliminating its third sub-
paragraph125 completely. This was done at the behest of the New York
City banks which strenuously objected to any codification in this area.226
Part 8: Miscellaneous
The five sections in this part include several provisions novel to the
statutory law of commercial paper. Three of these sections bear comment.
A. Conditional and Absolute Payment (3-802)
Under present decisional law if a check is taken as absolute payment
of an underlying obligation and the check is not paid, recourse is limited
to the check alone, the underlying debt having been discharged. On the
other hand, if a check is taken as conditional payment only, the obligee
has the alternative of recourse either upon the check or upon the under-
lying obligation. 2 7 A series of rules of presumption have developed to
determine whether the check was given as conditional or absolute pay-
ment in the absence of expressed intent. Briefly stated, the only combi-
nation of circumstances producing a presumption of absolute payment
requires the giving of a third person's instrument concurrent with the
creation of the debt.228 When the instrument is given in payment of a
precedent debt229 or when the debtor executes and delivers his own in-
strument in payment of either a contemporaneous or precedent debt, 230
222 1956 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n Rep. 417.
223 1956 Recommendations, supra note 32, at 130. The sections previously found in part 7
have become UCC §§ 4-501 to 504.
224 See UCC § 3-701, comments.
225 Section 3-701. Letter of Advice of International Sight Draft.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed and except where a draft is drawn under a credit issued
by the drawee, the drawee of an international sight draft owes the drawer no duty to
pay an unadvised draft but if it does so and the draft is genuine, may appropriately
debit the drawer's account.
226 The bankers argued that it "freezes a practice into the laws that may change from
time to time" and that "there is a move now among banks with a large volume of foreign
business to stop requiring advices in such cases." See Penney, "New York Revisits the
Code: Some Variations in the New York Enactments of the Uniform Commercial Code,"
62 Colum. L. Rev. 992, 1001.
227 Hamilton v. R. S. Dickson & Co., 85 F.2d 107, 107-08 (2d Cir. 1936). See generally
3 Daniel, Negotiable Instruments §§ 1447-55 (7th ed. 1933).
228 Kirkham v. Bank of America, 26 App. Div. 110, 49 N.Y. Supp. 767 (1st Dep't 1898),
aff'd, 165 N.Y. 132, 58 N.E. 753 (1900).
229 Cohen v. Rossmoore, 225 App. Div. 300, 233 N.Y. Supp. 196 (1st Dep't 1929).
230 Jagger Iron Co. v. Walker, 76 N.Y. 521 (1879).
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the presumption is that the instrument is given as conditional payment
only. The Code provision limits the presumption of absolute payment
to cases where the instrument given has a bank bound on it as drawer,
maker or accept6r and there is no recourse on the instrument against the
underlying obligor 23 1 The Code makes no distinction between contem-
poraneous and precedent debts.
B. "Vouching-In" Third Parties (3-803)
The Code provides new statutory language permitting a "defendant
... sued for breach of an obligation for which a third person is answer-
able over under this article" to vouch-in the third person by giving him
the appropriate written notice. Vouching-in is a recognized common law
device, but is available only against persons who will be directly re-
sponsible to the person first sued, if judgment goes against the
latter.232 Earlier, in section 3-306(d), the Code deals with the jus tertii
problem. In accordance with present law, the Code provides that a
defendant, having no defense of his own, may successfully defend if the
plaintiff stole the instrument or acquired it, with knowledge, from one
who did steal it.233 The failure to include the jus tertii defense of iMle-
gality in certain transactions may change New York law. 3 4 Both the
vouching-in procedure and the Code's jus tertii provisions will induce
third parties to come into the litigation itself 2 35
C. The Nonnegotiable Instrument (3-805)
An important new provision makes all of article 3 applicable to instru-
ments that fail of negotiability solely for the lack of being payable "to
order" or "to bearer."2 36 There can, however, be no "holder in due
course" of such instruments.3 7 Decisional authority dealing with non-
negotiable instruments is scarce and will be superseded by article 3.
231 UCC § 3-802(1) (a) See generally 1955 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n Rep. 1204-08.
On the related problem of bad checks and cash sales see Corman, "Cash Sales, Worthless
Checks and Bona Fide Purchaser," 10 Vand. L. Rev. 55 (1956); Void, Sales 169-84 (1959).
232 Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 281 N.Y. 162, 22 N.E.2d
324 (1939). See also, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 193-a (third party practice), 193-b (interven-
tion). Criticisms made by the New York Law Revision Commission are responsible for
the wording of the present text. 1956 Recommendations, supra note 32 at 132-33; 1956
N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n Rep. 418-19. For comparable sections under the new Civil
Practice Law (effective September 1, 1963), see N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law & Rules §§ 1007-11
(third party practice) and §§ 1012-14 (intervention).
233 Hays v. Hathorn, 74 N.Y. 486 (1878).
234 Hurley v. Union Trust Co., 244 App. Div. 590, 280 N.Y. Supp. 474 (3d Dep't 1935);
Singer v. Union Table and Spring Co., 151 Misc. 909, 271 N.Y. Supp. 349 (N.Y. Munic. Ct.
1934) ; N.Y. Pen. Law §§ 991-93 As to the possibility of a jus tertii defense in the finder
situation, see dictum in.Hurley v. Union Trust Co., supra.
235 UCC § 3-603(1); 1957 Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law 29-30. See also, Britton,
"Defenses, Claims of Ownership and Equities," 7 Hastings L.J. 1, 23-27 (1955).
236 UCC § 3-805.
237 Ibid.
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The few existing rules deal with an indorser's liability,238 the presump-
tions of consideration 239 and title.240
ARTICLE 4
Introductory Comments
Article 4 reflects the culmination of a long and troublesome effort to
achieve a uniform Code in the area of bank deposits and collections.24'
These provisions will supersede the ABA Bank Collection Code and a
variety of local collection statutes. 42
The article is divided into two portions; one governs bank collections
and the other the relationship between banks and their customers. The
statute embodies much of present law and practice, adding new provi-
sions where codification and certainty seems desirable. Some contro-
versial changes dealing with the bank-customer relationship are made
in part 4. The statute recognizes this area of the law as rapidly changing
and therefore provides for the application of Federal Reserve and clear-
ing house rules.243 Also, wide latitude is afforded to vary the terms of
the statute by agreement 2 44
Two typical problem patterns are illustrative of areas in which the
rules of article 4 will be applicable. Consider the example of a payee
in possession of a five hundred dollar check drawn upon an out-of-town
bank. The payee indorses the check "For Deposit Only," and then
deposits it in his local bank for credit to his account. Suppose that
sometime during the course of collection either the payor bank becomes
insolvent, the drawer of the check dies, or the drawer of the check stops
payment. The Code seeks to define the rights and duties as between the
five (possibly even more) different entities or individuals involved. There
is the bank of deposit, one or several intermediary banks, the payor bank,
and, of course, the payee and the drawer.
A particularly difficult and interesting problem is presented in the
case of stopped checks. Perplexing questions are created when a check
238 McMullen v. Rafferty, 89 N.Y. 456 (1882) (indorser a primary party); Seymour &
Bouck v. Van Slyck, 8 Wend. 403, 422 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832) (indorser not entitled to pre-
sentment or notice of dishonor).
239 .St. Lawrence County Nat'l Bank v. Watkins, 153 App. Div. 551, 138 N.Y. Supp. 116
(3rd Dep't 1912); Deyo v. Thompson, 53 App. Div. 9, 65 N.Y. Supp. 459 (3rd Dep't
1900).
240 Barrick v. Austin, 21 *Barb. 241 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1855) (dictum). See gen-
erally, Willier, "Non-Negotiable Instruments," 11 Syracuse L. Rev. 13-26 (1960).
241 Malcolm, "Article 4-A Battle with Complexity," 1952 Wis. L. Rev. 265.
242 For text of ABA Bank Collection Code, local variations and other bank collection
statutes see 2 Paton, Digest of Legal Opinions 1372-81 (1942) and supplements to § 27
of Code. Bank Collection Code Statutory Notes 1-14.
243 UCC § 4-103(2), (3).
244 UCC § 4-103. See generally Bunn, "Freedom of Contract under the Uniform Coin-
merial Code," 2 B. C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 59 (1960).
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is stopped but the payor bank inadvertently pays over the stop order.
Under present law, in the absence of an exculpation clause, the payor
bank must suffer the loss. 2 45 In most states the innocent but negligent
payor bank has no right to be subrogated to the customer's claim against
the payee, nor may the payor bank recover or defend against the
drawer.246 The Code goes a long way toward solving these problems.
Part 1: General Provisions and Definitions
As indicated by the heading, part 1 contains the general provisions and
definitions applicable throughout the article. There are several note-
worthy points among these general provisions.
A. Conflicts of Law Rule (4-102)
First, in order of appearance, is the section providing that the liability
of a bank for its activities in connection with the collection process is
to be determined by the law of the place where the bank is situated.247
This rule, measuring liability by the law of the situs of the bank
handling the item in the course of transit, seems highly beneficial and
has the advantage of certainty. If this Code section governs the liability
of a depository bank to the beneficial owner of an item received from a
fiduciary with notice of the fiduciary relation, a change in New York law
is effected. In the case of Weissman v. Banque de Bruxelles,24 the law
of the place where the agency for collection was to be performed deter-
mined the liability of the depository bank rather than the situs of the
depository bank which converted the check.249 On the other hand, in a
case involving the failure of an intermediary bank, the New York Court
of Appeals refused to measure the liability of the prior intermediary
bank, which accepted the failed bank's draft, by the law of the juris-
diction where the prior intermediary bank was situated.250 The court
argued that the contract was to be performed either in Texas, the situs
of the payor bank, or in New York where the owner of the instrument
was located, rather than in Tennessee, the location of the intermediary
bank to whom the New York owner of the check had forwarded the item
for collection. The Code conflicts rule seems relatively easy of appli-
245 Chase Nat'l Bank v. Battat, 297 N.Y. 185, 78 N.E.2d 465 (1948). This case pre-
sumes the absence of "ratification." See Morrison & Sneed, "Bank Collections: The Stop
Payment Transaction-A Comparative Study," 32 Texas L. Rev. 259 (1954).
246 Morrison & Sneed, supra note 245 at 312; Comment, 15 Calif. L. Rev. 235 (1927).
Note, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 110 (1926).
247 UCC § 4-102(2).
248 254 N.Y. 488, 173 N.E. 835 (1930) (depository bank converted check by accepting
for collection on behalf of fiduciary).
249 1955 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n Rep. 1257; for Notes on the Weissman case, see 31
Colum. L. Rev. 704 (1931), 29 Mich. L. Rev. 928 (1931).
250 Saint Nicholas Bank v. State Natl Bank, 128 N.Y. 26, 27 N.E. 849 (1891).
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cation, is preferable to the present muddled state of the law of New York
in this area and appears to adopt the majority rule.251
B. Variations by Agreement-Custom and Usage (4-103)
Article 4 contains a specific provision permitting variation of its term
by contract. 52 The only limitations imposed are that such contracts
may not exculpate the bank for lack of good faith or failure to exercise
ordinary care.153 The Code further provides that such contracts may
not limit the measure of damages for such lack or failure. 54 The section
adds, however, that the parties may agree upon standards of care that
are not manifestly unreasonable.255 Appreciation of the importance of
banking practices and the "official" and "quasi-official" agreements and
rules operative in the banking industry is expressed in the provisions
making Federal Reserve regulations, clearing house rules, and general
banking usage applicable to article 4 transactions. Of particular interest
is that such rules and usage are made binding even without the bank's
or customer's assent.256
Of primary concern is the application of the article 4 section prohibit-
ing disclaimers of ordinary care to exculpation clauses in stop payment
orders. The law of New York and several other states now permit such
disclaimers.257 The validity of such exculpation clauses has been widely
discussed and litigated. The weight of authority, including' the most
recent cases, denies effect to such agreements.258 Nine states and Puerto
Rico have passed upon the validity of exculpatory agreements and stop
orders; four jurisdictions uphold such agreements and six treat them as
invalid.259
251 See Old Company's Lehigh v. Meeker, 71 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1934); 1955 N.Y. Law
Revision Comm'n Rep. 1260.
252 UCC § 4-103(1). Compare N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law §§ 350-a, 350-b(4). See gen-
erally Bunn, supra note 244. See also Brome, "Bank Deposits and Collections," 16 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 308, 310-14 (1950).
253 UCC § 4-103(1). Contra, Isler v. National Park Bank, 239 N.Y. 462, 470, 147 N.E.
66, 69 (1925) ; Briggs v. Central Nat'l Bank, 89 N.Y. 182 (1882) ; Allen v. Merchants' Bank,
22 Wend. 215 (N.Y. 1839).
254 UCC § 4-103(1).
255 Ibid.
256 UCC § 4-103(2), (3). See Hogan & Penney, supra note 206, at 144 for citation of
cases where courts have refused to bind nonmember and nonconsenting parties to clearing
house rules and local banking customs.
257 Galta v. Windsor Bank, 251 N.Y. 152, 154-55, 167 N.E. 203, 204 (1929); Seldowitz
v. Manufacturer's Trust Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 579, 202 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1st Dep't 1960).
For collection of cases in other jurisdictions see Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 1155 (1948). See also
3 Paton, supra note 242, at 3469-74.
258 3 Paton, supra note 242, at 3469-74.
259 The two courts currently upholding such agreements, in addition to New York, are
Puerto Rico\ (Martinez v. National City Bank, 80 F. Supp. 545 (D.P.R. 1948)) and Indiana
(Hodnick v\! Fidelity Trust Co., 96 Ind. App. 342, 183 N.E. 488 (1932)). Although
Massachusetts was previously in this group (Tremont Trust Co. v. Burack, 235 Mass. 398,
126 N.E. 782 (1920)), the adoption of the Code in 1957 reversed that state's position.
States which deny effect to such an agreement are: Alabama (Commercial Bank v. Hall,
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In New York the rule permitting exculpation clauses has been some-
what modified. The disclaimer clause does not protect the bank from
liability for willful disregard of the order.260 A recent lower court deci-
sion denied a summary judgment to the defendant bank where a cause
of action in negligence was alleged in the complaint notwithstanding
the presence of an exculpation clause.
261
C. Branch Banks (4-106)
The New York enactment adds language to the section on branch
banks to the effect that the receipt of notice by the branch concerned
determines the bank's status as a holder in due course.2 6 2 This amend-
ment reflects another instance of the New York City bankers' efforts to
achieve a workable legal framework in which their large-scale and multi-
branched operations may be economically conducted. 63
D. Extended Day To Obtain Payment (4-108)
The Code contains a salutory provision continuing the New York
statutory rule permitting a collecting bank to extend the time for pay-
ment up to one day in a good faith effort to collect.264 The Code extends
the present New York statute, applicable to "items drawn on a drawer
other than a bank," to all "specific items."
Part 2: Collection of Items: Depository and Collecting Banks
A. Agency and Subagency Relationships (4-201, -203)
Generally, the bank of deposit takes as agent for collection rather
than as owner.2 16  The agreement between the depositor and the deposi-
tory bank often provides for the agency relationship. 6 If the indorse-
ment is general, however, rather than restrictive, courts have held that
subsequent banks are entitled to regard the first bank taker as owner. 6
266 Ala. 57, 94 So. 2d 198 (1957)); California (Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App.
362, 367, 248 Pac. 947, 952 (1926)); Connecticut (Calamita v. Tradesmen's Nat'l Bank, 135
Conn. 326, 64 A.2d 46 (1949), 25 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 419 (1950)); New Jersey (Reinhardt v.
Passaic-Clifton Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 16 NJ. Super. 430, 84 A.2d 741 (1951), aff'd,
9 N.J. 607, 89 A.2d 242 (1952); Ohio (Speroff v. First-Central Trust Co., 149 Ohio St. 415,
79 N.E.2d 119 (1948)); Pennsylvania (Thomas v. First Nat'l Bank, 376 Pa. 181, 101 A.2d
910 (1954)).
260 Pyramid Musical Corp. v. Floral Park Bank, 268 App. Div. 783, 48 N.Y.S.2d 866
(2d Dep't 1944); Seldowitz v. Manufacturer's Trust Co., supra note 257.
261 Capritta v. National Commercial Bank, 26 Misc. 2d 71, 206 N.Y.S.2d 726 (Albany
City Ct. 1960).
262 N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1962, ch. 553, § 4-106 (effective Sept. 24, 1964).
263 Penney, "New York Revisits the Code: Some Variations in the New York Enactment
of the Uniform Commercial Code," 62 Colum. L. Rev. 992, 1002 (1962).
264 Compare UCC § 4-108(1) with N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 350-d(2).
265 See Brome, supra note 252, at 311. See also 2 Paton, supra note 242, at 1251-52.
266 2 Paton, supra note 242, at 1256-57.
267 2 Paton, supra note 242, at 1254. See also N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 350-c; Carson
v. Federal Reserve Bank, 266 App. Div. 225, 235 N.Y. Supp. 197 (4th Dep't 1929).
[Vol. 48
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: SYMPOSIUM
The Code extends the present presumption of agency to apply without
regard to the form of the indorsement."" It also provides that "unless
the contrary appears" the first bank and all subsequent banks in the
collection process are agent and subgents not only without regard to the
form of the indorsement, but even if credit is given subject to immediate
withdrawal or, in fact, withdrawn.2 9 This represents an extension of
the so-called "Massachusetts Rule," as reflected in the ABA Bank Col-
lection Code.270 To afford some protection to collecting banks, the Code
makes the right of the owner-depositor subject to the rights of collecting
banks such as those resulting from its outstanding advances on the
item.27' The collecting bank is given a "security interest" rather than
any rights as "owner. ' 272 Another Code provision establishes a "chain of
command" rule as between collecting banks . 7  This Code section permits
an intermediary collecting bank to heed only the instructions given by
the bank from which the item is taken for collection. This is inconsistent
with the approach of the "Massachusetts rule," continued in the Code,
insofar as it denies the right of the owner, as principal, to claim an item
in the course of collection direct from a so-called "subagent." Appar-
ently the draftsmen felt that any occasional benefit to owner-depositors
was not worth impairing the freedom of action of intermediary banks.27 4
B. Direct Routing (4-204, -212)
The common law deemed the direct sending of items to payor banks
for collection improper .2 7  The ABA Bank Collection Code and Federal
Reserve regulations reversed this rule.276  The Code also permits direct
sending, and in addition allows direct sending to nonbank payors, where
268 UCC § 4-201(l).
269 Ibid.
270 See ABA Bank Collection Code §§ 2, 4. See N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law §§ 350-a,
350-c. For a discussion of the "Massachusetts rule," see Sneed & Morrison," Bank Collec-
tions-A Comparative Study," 29 Texas L. Rev. 713, 727-28 (1951); Trumbull, "Bank
Deposits and Collections in Illinois Under the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code," 55
Nw. L. Rev. 253, 259-61 (1960).
271 UCC § 4-201(1). See also UCC § 3-206, as to the effect of a restrictive endorsement,
and discussion in text following note 67, supra.
272 UCC § 4-208. See Trumbull, supra note 270, at 270-72.
273 UCC § 4-203. Compare N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 350-a (authority to follow
instructions of immediate forwarding bank), and Florida Citrus Exch. v. Union Trust
Co., 244 App: Div. 68, 278 N.Y. Supp. 313 (4th Dep't 1935).
274 See Connecticut Temporary Comm'n to Study The Uniform Commercial Code, Study
and Report 28-29 (1959). Compare Soma v. Handrulis, 277 N.Y. 223, 14 N.E.2d 46 (1938)
holding an intermediary collecting bank liable for overlooking a depositor's restrictive
endorsement.
275 Brady, Bank Checks 235-38 (Bailey ed. 1962), reprinted from 78 Banking L.J. 652-55
(1961).
276 See ABA Bank Collection Code § 6 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 350-e) and
Regulations G and J (applicable to Federal Reserve banks). See generally 2 Paton, supra
note 242, at 1305-24.
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the transferor's authorization is obtained. 7 This latter practice is cur-
rently sanctioned for Federal Reserve Banks by Regulations G and J
and is a growing practice support by custom and Clearing House rules
because of the convenience afforded to the commercial world.178 New
York has adopted the optional Code provision permitting direct return
of an unpaid item to the bank of deposit. 7 9 The delay of handling by
intermediary banks is avoided and depository banks may act more
quickly to protect themselves. The question has been raised, however,
whether such speedy return might n6t be outweighed by legal compli-
cations resulting from such a practice.8 '
C. Missing Indorsements (4-205) and Bank Transfer Marking (4-206)
Under N.I.L. § 49,21 the transferee of an instrument lacking the
payee's endorsement takes it subject to any defenses of the drawer
against the payee.282 It has been argued, however, that although a bank
is not obliged to pay a check with a missing indorsement, even when
guaranteed by a collecting bank, the payor bank should pay the check
in the ordinary case "to facilitate business."2 3 Apparently depository
banks as a common practice supply missing indorsements, notwithstand-
ing the absence of legal sanction. The Code approves this practice in
the absence of contrary instructions by the drawer,28 4 thereby avoiding
the ordinarily meaningless and time-consuming return of the item for
indorsement by the customer. A related provision which anticipates
electronic check processing, is found in the section providing that. any
agreed method of marking checks which identifies the transferor bank is
sufficient for the item's further transfer to another bank.285 Banks may
therefore simplify their indorsement stamps and adopt a numerical or
other code system which by agreement or usage would produce the same
result as the layers of undecipherable indorsement stamps now found
on the backs of checks. Presumably any type of machine encoding or
marking would be sufficient.
277 UCC § 4-204(2)(b).
278 Clarke, Bailey, & Young, Bank Deposits and Collections 69 (1959).
279 UCC § 4-212(2). Of the eighteen states including New York that have adopted
the Code, all but three, Georgia, New Jersey and Oregon, have also adopted this optional
subsection (2).
280 Clarke, "Bank Deposits and Collections: Article IV; Letters of Credit: Article V,"
16 Ark. L. Rev. 45, 56 (1961). See also Brady, Bank Checks 412-14 (Bailey ed. 1962),
reprinted from 79 Banking L.J. 393-95 (1962).
281 N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 79.
282 2 Paton, supra note 242, at 2131-32.
283 Id. at 2134, 2138-39.
284 UCC § 4-205(1). See Brady, Bank Checks 206-07 (Bailey ed. 1962), reprinted from
78 Banking L.J. 857-58 (1961).
285 UCC § 4-206. See Bankers Manual on the Uniform Commercial Code 35 (1958). See
also Brady, Bank Checks 222-23 (Bailey ed. 1962), reprinted from 78 Banking L.J., 873-74
(1961).
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D. Warranties of Depositors (4-207)
The warranties of the depositor may be divided into those given to
banks in the chain of collection and those given to the payor. Under
present law the indorsing depositor, depending upon the character of his
indorsement, gives warranties to subsequent parties.28 6 If he indorses
generally he warrants "to all subsequent holders in due course. . that
the instrument is at the time of his indorsement valid and subsisting"
and engages that on due presentment "it shall be accepted or paid, or
both . . .according to its tenor. 28 7 No warranty is presently made by
the depositor to the drawee or payor.2" The Code imposes the same
warranties on "customer and collecting bank" in article 4 as are imposed
upon presenting persons and transferors in article 3 .289 The warranties
run to both intermediary and payor banks. The warranty sections in
both articles 3 and 4 make a distinction, however, between the war-
ranties given to payor banks on the one hand and to transferees and
collecting banks on the other. Reflecting the codification of the rule in
Price v. Neal, earlier discussed,29 ° no warranty of the genuineness of the
drawer's signature is made to the payor bank by a "customer or collect-
ing bank that is a holder in due course and acts in good faith. ' 2 1 The
warranties in the article 4 provision are more narrow than those in
article 3 in that they are given only by "customers and collecting banks."
On the other hand, they cover "items," a broader category than the
"instruments" governed by article 3.292
E. Media of Remittance (4-211)
The Code liberalizes the requirements as to the media of remittance
acceptable by a collecting bank. Under the present law the collecting
bank is permitted to accept bank checks but not checks or drafts drawn
on the remitting bank itself.2"3 The Code permits the acceptance of the
remitter's cashier's check where the collecting and paying bank are
members of the same clearing house or group.294 Unless support for
286 N.I.L. §§ 65, 66 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law §§ 115, 116); Brannan, Negotiable In-
struments Law 957-58 (Beutel 7th ed. 1948) ; Brome, supra note 252, at 317-19.
287 N.I.L. § 66 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 116); Brome, supra note 252, at 315.
288 Brannan, supra note 286, at 959-60.
289 Compare UCC §§ 3-417 and 4-207. Note that the article 4 warranties cover
"items," a broader category than the instruments governed by article 3.
290 See text following note 172, supra.
291 UCC § 4-207(1)(b). See generally Brady, Bank Checks 223-27 (Bailey ed. 1962),
xeprinted from 78 Banking LJ. 874-78 (1961) ; Comment, 23 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 198, 211 (1961).
292 Compare UCC § 4-207 with § 3-417.
293 ABA Bank Collection Code § 9. See also N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 350-i. See
Clarke, Bailey, & Young, supra note 278, at 92-93.
294 UCC § 4-211(1)(b).
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such a practice may be found in statutes approving "such... method of
settlement as may be customary," '295 this is new law.
F. Finality of Payment (4-213, -303)
A great variety of rules have developed attempting to define the cir-
cumstances under which an item may be deemed finally paid. As many
as ten different rules have been described. 96 This variety is in part
attributable to the two distinct classes of situations where the question of
final payment arises.2 97 In one class the concern is whether the drawer
and indorsers have been discharged. In the other, the issue is whether
the amount of the item is still in the drawer's account subject to stop
payment, set-off or garnishment. By way of example, the following
typical acts have been included as constituting final payment: credit
to presenting banks on books of payor bank; drawing of remittance
instrument by payor banks; stamping of items "Paid"; entering charge
to customer's account. The Code selects and lists a number of acts
by the payor bank as constituting final payment. 9  These include
payment in cash, the making of final settlement for the item, or of an
unrevoked provisional settlement within the time allowed in the deferred
posting provision.299 One of the acts included in the Code is the com-
pletion of "the process of posting."300 Some doubt was expressed
in New York and elsewhere as to whether this term means the actual
making of entries in the customer's account, or whether it was intended
to include other steps in the normal payment procedure. This question
is of particular importance to banks utilizing electronic posting tech-
niques. Many such banks complete their electronic "posting" before
any manual steps, such as verification of the drawers' signatures, are
performed. A new section was included in the New York enactment
of the Code to meet this difficulty.301 The section defines the term
"process of posting" to embrace all of the usual steps taken in the
processing of checks for payment; the section makes clear, however,
that the "key point in time is the completion of all the steps followed
in a particular bank's 'payment' procedure."" 2
The Code contains a provision clarifying the question of when a.
295 See ABA Bank Collection Code § 9 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 350-i) (variant).
296 Malcolm, "Article 4-A Battle with Comple)dty," 1952 Wis. L. Rev. 265, 287-95.
Clarke, Bailey, & Young, supra note 278, at 74-76.
297 Trumbull, supra note 270, at 273-75.
298 UCC 9§ 4-213(1), 4-303(1).
299 UCC 99 4-213(1)(a), (b), (d) ; 4-303(1)(b), (c), (e). See also UCC § 4-301 (deferred
posting section).
300 UCC 99 4-213(1)(c), 4-303(1)(d).
301 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 553, § 4-409 (effective Sept. 27, 1964).
302 See Penney, supra note 263, at 1002-03.
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remittance instrument or authorization to charge an account becomes
final. 3 Settlement by remittance instrument becomes final at the time
the remittance instrument is paid, unless a nonbank check or other
instrument not approved by the Code was authorized. In the latter case
settlement becomes final upon receipt of the instrument.304
G. Insolvency and Preference (4-214)
The Code contains a section governing the effect of the insolvency
,or other suspension of payments on the part of a collecting or payor bank
-while an item or its proceeds are in the process of collection or remit-
tance. The Code provision is generally in accord and parallel in organ-
ization with A.B.A. Bank Collection Code section 13.305 Following the
approach of the ABA statute, the Code deals with the rights of the par-
ties where:
(1) final payment of an item has not occurred prior to suspension of
a collecting or payor bank; 30 6
(2) the payor bank suspends payments after making final payment
but before making settlement; 307 and
(3) a collecting bank suspends payments after receiving a settlement.308
The Code adds a new provision governing the case where a payor or
collecting bank gives or receives a provisional settlement and then sus-
pends payments.3 9 The Code abandons the trust theory found in the
Bank Collection Code. The preference provisions3' ° are probably in-
applicable to national banks because of the overriding preference pro-
visions of federal law.311
303 UCC § 4-211(3).
304 UCC § 4-211(3) (b) ; Trumbull, supra note 270, at 276; Clarke, Bailey, &Young, supra
note 278, at 94. See N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law §§ 350-b, 350-j; Jones v. Board of Educ.,
242 App. Div. 17, 272 N.Y. Supp. 5 (2d Dep't, 1934); United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v.
City of Hornell, 146 Misc. 812, 263 N.Y. Supp. 89 (Sup. Ct. Steuben County 1933); Matter
of Jayne & Mason, 140 Misc. 822, 251 N.Y. Supp. 768 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1931). The
time of final settlement is important in UCC §§ 4-201, 4-212, 4-213, 4-214.
305 N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 350-1.
806 Compare UCC § 4-214(1) with ABA Bank Collection Code § 13(1) (N.Y. Negotiable
Instr. Law § 350-1(1)).
307 Compare UCC § 4-214(2) with ABA Bank Collection Code § 13(2) (N.Y. Negotiable
Instr. Law § 350-1(2)).
308 Compare UCC § 4-214(4) with ABA Bank Collection Code § 13(3) (N.Y. Negotiable
Instr. Law § 350-1(3)).
309 See UCC § 4-214(3). There is no comparable ABA Bank Collection Code provision.
310 UCC § 4-214(4).
311 Jennings v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 294 U.S. 216 (1935). Section 1-108,
however, would preserve the applicability of UCC § 4-214 to state banks.
For discussion of UCC § 4-214 generally see Brady, Bank Checks 326-34 (Bailey ed. 1962),
reprinted from 79 Banking LJ. 119-28 (1962); Brome, "Bank Deposits and Collections,"
16 Law & Contemp. Prob. 324-27 (1950); Clarke, Bailey, & Young, supra note 278, at 144-
51; Trumbull, supra note 270, at 277-80.
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Part 3: Collection of Items-Payor Banks
A. Deferred Posting (4-301)
Deferred posting has been described as "a practice whereby all checks
received by a payor bank on one business day are accumulated and
'posted' to the ledger accounts of the drawers at one time during the
next day as contrasted with the practice of 'dribble posting' whereby
checks are posted from time to time during the day of receipt. ' 31 The
practice developed as a device to meet personnel shortage problems
during World War II. The procedure was first sanctioned by an amend-
ment of Federal Reserve Regulation J and a revision of the deposit
contract form. The American Bankers Association then developed and
sponsored the so-called "Model Deferred Posting Statute" which, with
occasional variations, has been adopted in some 39 states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia.3 13 The model statute permits a drawee bank receiv-
ing a demand item, other than for payment over the counter, and which
remits and gives credit for such item on the day of receipt to return
such item for credit or refund at any time before midnight of the next
succeeding business day.314
The Code continues the substance of the deferred posting statute,
but excludes documentary drafts. 15 Anomalously, although the Model
Deferred Posting Statute states the bank's duty in the handling of
checks for payment, there are no provisions for the results of non-
compliance. 16 N.I.L. section 137 '1 gives the drawee twnty-four hours
to decide whether to accept a bill of exchange and-provides that the
drawee is deemed to have accepted the bill if he fails to return it within
that period. In State Bank v. Weiss,31 a New York court interpreted this
N.I.L. section to mean that failure of a drawee bank to return checks
presented for payment within twenty-four hours of their delivery, or
to give proper notice of dishonor within such period, amounted to an
acceptance. The Code includes a specific section making the payor
bank "accountable" for items not promptly or properly handled within
the limits prescribed by the deferred posting section.319
312 Brome, supra note 311, at 321. See also Leary, "Deferred Posting and Delayed Re-
turns-The Current Check Collection Problem," 62 Harv. L. Rev. 905 (1949).
313 Brome, supra note 311, at 322; N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 350-b. For text of
ABA Model Deferred Posting Statute and citations to adopting states, see Paton, Digest of
Legal Opinion, "Collection" § 27 (Supp. 1, 1957).
314 Brome, supra note 311, at 322.
315 UCC § 4-301(1).
316 Leary, supra note 312, at 927.
33- N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 225.
318 46 Misc. 93, 91 N.Y. Supp. 276 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 1904). See, however, Matte-
son v. Moulton, 79 N.Y 627 (1880) (contrary holding under an earlier statute similar to
N.I.L.). See generally, Britton, Bills and Notes 515-17 (2d ed. 1961).
319 UCC § 4-302.
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Part 4: Payor Bank and the Customer
The most controversial and interesting provisions found in either
article 3 or article 4 are found in this part of article 4 dealing with the
relationship between the payor bank and its customer. Several of these
provisions were at one time located in article 3.3'0 It has been vigorously
argued that the rules in article 4, part 4, have no proper place in the
Uniform Commercial Code in view of the local character of their im-
pact.2 ' Undoubtedly, an important reason for their having been sub-
jected to such vigorous criticism is the fact that they may have an im-
portant, and sometimes costly, effect on the operations of commercial
banks.32 This is particularly true with respect to the stop payment
provisions which, together with the anti-exculpation provision men-
tioned earlier, would impose an increased burden upon commercial
banks.2 3 The only offsetting feature is the availability of subrogation
rights which presents some problems in New York.324
A. Wrongful Dishonor (4-402)
The Code provision on wrongful dishonor involves several minor
changes in present law. The Code provides a specific rule as to the
measure of damages, where the dishonor occurred through a mistake. 25
Actual damages proved is made the limit for innocent mistakes.326 The
changes include: the abandonment of the rule permitting recovery of
nominal damages for a technical breach;327 the abandonment of the
"trader" rule; 328 and the abandonment of the special rule for fiduciaries
permitting the recovery of substantial damages for innocent mistake
without proof of actual injury.32 9 The Code contains a novel provision
permitting the recovery of damages for arrest or prosecution or other
consequential damages when wrongful dishonor is established as the
proximate cause of such damages.330
320 Clarke, Bailey, & Young, supra note 278, at 12. See also Leary, "Some Clarifications
in the Law of Commercial Paper Under the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code," 97
U. Pa. L. Rev. 354, 360-70 (1949).
321 Malcolm, supra note 296, at 295.
322 On the other hand, Professor Beutel at one time vigorously castigated article 4 as a
"piece of vicious class legislation" favoring bankers. Beutel, "The Proposed Uniform (?)
Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted," 61 Yale L.J. 334, 357-63 (1952).
323 See discussion in text following note 256, supra.
324 See discussion in text following note 341, infra.
325 UCC § 4-402.
326 Ibid. Accord as to innocent mistakes: Citizens' Nat'l Bank v. Importers & Trader's
Bank, 119 N.Y. 195, 23 N.E. 540 (1890) ; Levine v. State Bank, 80 Misc. 524, 141 N.Y. Supp.
596 (1st Dep't 1913).
327 Compare Clark Co. v. Mt. Morris Bank, 85 App. Div. 362, 83 N.Y. Supp. 447 (1st
Dep't 1903), aff'd, 181 N.Y. 533, 73 N.E. 1133 (1905).
328 Compare Wildenberger v. Ridgewood Nat'l Bank, 230 N.Y. 425, 130 N.E. 600 (1921).
329 Compare Nealis v. Industrial Bank of Commerce, 200 Misc. 406, 107 N.Y.S.2d 264
(Sup. Ct., New York County 1951).
330 No New York decisions involving damages for arrest and prosecution caused by
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B. Stop Payment (4-403)
The drawer's right to stop payment is not treated by the N.I.L.,
but several states have enacted controlling statutes. 3 1 The Code pro-
vides for the right of the drawer, by timely action, to stop payment
on a check not yet accepted or paid." ' Oral stop payment orders are
validated for 14 days unless confirmed in writing within that period.
The written order is effective for six months unless renewed in writing.333
The provision giving effect to the oral order has been heavily attacked
from the time of its drafting.3 4 The common and statutory law of most
states makes oral orders effective. 3 5 The six month's limit on written
orders is in conformity with the time periods imposed by the majority
of statutes enacted on this subject."'
The Code also contains a provision requiring that a stop payment
order be received at such time and in such manner as to afford a rea-
sonable opportunity for the bank to act.83 7
New York has long adhered to the doctrine of "ratification" in deal-
ing with cases of inadvertent payments by banks over stop payment orders.
If a customer ratifies the payment by the payor bank, then the cus-
tomer is barred in his action seeking a recredit to his account. Although
"ratification" has been much discussed, there are relatively few cases
demonstrating the application of the doctrine. In American Defense
Soc'y v. Sherman Nat'l Bank,3 38 the court stated that ratification may
be evidenced by the fact that the customer "had credited himself upon
its books with payment or had in any way recognized his receipt of
the money .... 11339 To be considered in connection with the doctrine of
wrongful dishonor have been found. See, however, Robbins v. Bankers Trust Co., 4 Misc.
2d 347, 157 N.Y.S.2d 56 (Sup. Ct., Bronx County 1956). See Morris, "Bank's Liability To
Its Depositor For His Arrest As the Result of the Bank's Failure To Have Properly Hon-
ored His Check," 78 Banking LJ. 491 (1961).
On wrongful dishonor generally see Brady, Bank Checks 363-74 (Bailey ed. 1962), re-
printed from 79 Banking LJ. 278-86 (1962) ; I Paton, supra note 313, at 1112-23.
331 See collection of statutes in 3 Paton, supra note 313, at 3462-63.
332 UCC § 4-403(1). Accord, American Defense Soc'y v. Sherman Nat'l Bank, 225 N.Y.
506, 122 N.E. 695 (1919). See generally Note, 28 Ind. L.J. 95 (1952).
333 UCC § 4-403(2). Oral orders are effective in New York. K & K Silk Trimming Co.
v. Garfield Nat'l Bank, 127 Misc. 27, 215 N.Y. Supp. 269 (1st Dept., 1926).
334 See Leary, "Some Clarifications in the Law of Commercial Paper Under the Proposed
Uniform Commercial Code," 97 U. Pa. L. Rev. 354, 365-66; (1949); 1954 N.Y. Law Revision
Comm'n Rep. 306; N.Y. Clearing House Ass'n Rep. on the Uniform Commercial Code 25
(Dec. 1, 1961).
335 Brady, Bank Checks 425 (Bailey ed. 1962), reprinted from 79 Banking L.'. 194 (1962).
336 See statutes referred to in note 331, supra.
337 UCC § 4-403(1). Accord, A. Sidney Davison Coal Co. v. National Park Bank, 201
App. Div. 309, 194 N.Y. Supp. 220 (1st Dep't 1922). See also Davis, Inc. v. Chemung
Canal Trust Co., 9 App. Div. 2d 562, 189 N.Y.S.2d 320 (3rd Dep't 1959).
838 225 N.Y. 506, 122 N.E. 695 (1919).
339 The court also states, however, that the customer may "not make a profit out of the
bank's mistake and could only recover that, which it lost." Id. at 509. 122 N.E. at 695-96.
Compare Ted Granville Co. v. Chemical Bank and Trust Co., 8 Misc. 2d 806, 160 N.Y.S.
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ratification, is the nature of the customer's action against the bank for
erroneously paying over the stop payment order. Historically, the New
York courts have adhered to a theory of "account" with the face amount
of the check constituting the measure of recovery.s4 0 No obligation
has been imposed on the customer to prove his actual loss as part of his
prima facie case, and the bank has not been permitted to defend by
showing a discharge of the customer's obligation to the payee."'
C. Payor Bank's Right to Subrogation (4-407)
The Code draftsmen have provided a right of subrogation to the
payor bank in an effort to compensate for the burden imposed by the
anti-exculpation clause provision and the rights afforded to customers
to stop payment on their checks. An illustrative fact pattern demon-
strating a need for such a provision was related in the 1954 Law Revision
Commission hearing by Mr. Walter Malcolm. 3 42 A lady took her fur
coat to a furrier for repairs. When she called for the coat she was told
that the charges were one hundred fifty dollars. She protested that this
was an exorbitant price and argued that the job was only worth fifty
dollars. The furrier replied that unless she paid his price, she would
not get her coat. The lady grudgingly drew her check for one hundred
fifty dollars and obtained her coat. Shortly after leaving the furrier
she telephoned her bank and stopped payment. The bank overlooked
the stop payment order and paid the check, charging the lady's account.
In due course the lady discovered the error and demanded that her
account be restored. The bank officials attempted to mollify her by
offering to recredit her account for one hundred dollars since she had
acknowledged that the repair job was worth at least fifty dollars. She
refused and insisted that the full one hundred fifty be credited. Suit
was brought against the bank by the lady and the bank, in turn, sued
the furrier on the theory that if the bank was indebted to the lady, it
had a claim against the furrier. The actions were tried in a lower
court in Massachusetts, the bank suffering defeat in both actions. The
lady was awarded the full one hundred fifty dollars and the judgment
was rendered in favor of the furrier in the bank's action against him.
2d 959 (1957). See also on ratification, Woodmere Cedarhurst Corp. v. National City Bank,
157 Misc. 660, 284 N.Y. Supp. 238 (1st Dep't 1935); Kasnowitz v. Manufacturers Trust Co.,
172 Misc. 242, 14 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y. City Court 1939).
340 Iorrison & Sneed, "Bank Collections: The Stop-Payment Transaction-A Comparative
Study," 32 Texas L. Rev. 259, 313 (1954).
341 See American Defense Soc'y v. Sherman, supra note 338. See also Woodmere Cedar-
hurst Corp. v. National City Bank, supra note 339. 45 Yale L.J. 1134 (1936). See also 1955
N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n Rep. Vol. 2 at 67; Comment, 20 U. Chi. L. Rev. 667 (1953);
Note, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 110 (1926).
342 1954 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n Rep. 468.
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The lady got her repair job for nothing, the furrier kept the full price,
and the bank was out one hundred fifty dollars as a result of some
technical rules of law that here seemed to work an unjust result. 43 The
new subrogation provision in the Code is designed to give the bank in
such a situation the right to be subrogated to both any claim that its
customer, the lady, might have against the payee furrier and the rights
that the payee may have against the customer. In some states this Code
provision would continue similar rules found in local statutes.3 44  In
other states the provision offers a workable and equitable device for
avoiding the harshness of the rules of stop payment.345 In New York
some difficulty may be encountered in view of the Code language that
"to prevent unjust enrichment . . . the payor bank shall be subro-
gated .... )2346 The problem is presented by the fact that a recent deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals has announced that there is no unjust
enrichment when a bank inadvertently pays over a stop order not-
withstanding that the customer's obligation is discharged in whole or
in part by such payment.347
D. Stale Checks (4-404)
Under existing law a bank to which is presented a check dated sub-
stantially earlier than the day of presentment, is faced with a serious
dilemma. If the check is "stale" then the bank may not charge the
drawer's account unless the payment is made with the drawer's con-
sent. On the other hand, if the check is not "stale" and the bank re-
fuses payment, the bank may be liable to the customer for wrongful
dishonor. To alleviate this problem stale check statutes have been
adopted in some twenty-six jurisdictions, fifteen adopting a one-year
limitation, and eleven a six-month limitation. 48
New York has no such statute. How old a check has to be before
it becomes "stale" is not at all certain. The Code provision solves this
dilemma by specifically permitting a bank to refuse to pay an item more
than six months after its date. 49 The Code contains an additional
343 In a letter to the Law Revision Commission, Mr. William Wemple suggested that
the New York doctrine of ratification might justify the bank in charging the lady's account
in this case. 1954 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n Rep. 364-68. Quaere whether retaining the
coat would operate as ratification. What else was she supposed to do with it?
344 6 La. Rev. Stat. § 42 (1950) ; N.J. Stat. Ann. 17: 9 A-225 (B) (4) (New Jersey statute
replaced by UCC § 4-407).
345 For a discussion of the present law of subrogation in this context, see references in
note 341, supra.
346 UCC § 4-407.
347 Chase Natl Bank v. Battat, 297 N.Y. 185, 78 N.E.2d 465 (1948). See also 1955
N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n Rep. 1553.
348 Leary, supra note 334, at 364. See also 1 Paton, supra note 313, at 1107-12.
349 UCC § 4-404. See Goldberg v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 199 Misc. 167, 102 N.Y.S.2d
144 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1951). See also § 3-304(3)(c) and discussion in text following note
101, supra.
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provision permitting the bank to pay checks even after six months so
long as the bank pays in "good faith."350 This latter provision has been
criticized by the New York City bankers. The criticism stems from a
legitimate concern over the meaning of good faith, defined earlier in
the Code as "honesty in fact."35 The bankers have urged abandoning
the good faith provision and substituting language permitting the banks
to pay at any time in the absence of an effective stop payment order.352
This would represent a complete departure from the "stale check rule."
Re-insertion of the commercial reasonableness standard might be de-
sirable here. "Honesty in fact" in this context seems virtually meaning-
less. The provision was apparently designed to protect banks in pay-
ing checks which they legitimately, honestly, or in good faith believed
their customers would want to have paid. Such checks might include
checks payable to the order of tax collectors or insurance companies.
The problem, of course, is particularly acute when the drawer cannot
be reached.
E. Payment of Checks After Death or Incompetence of Customer (4-405)
The effect of the customer's death or incompetence on the authority
of a payor to pay is set forth in section 4-405. While in general an
agency is revoked automatically by death353 a well recognized exception
protects a bank in paying a check or draft without notice of the death
of the drawer.354 Several states have enacted statutes permitting banks
to pay for a limited period after death regardless of notice.355 The Code
includes a provision, according with New York decisional law, 5' which
authorizes a bank to pay a depositor's checks until it has "knowledge"
of the depositor's dedth. The Code adds a provision, contrary to present
law in New York, but similar to the statutes in many states, providing
a ten day period even after knowledge of death during which the
payor bank may pay or certify checks.3 7 The new statute also substitutes
a clear rule for a present disparity among the cases in the related drawer-
incompetency situation.358
350 Ibid.
351 UCC § 1-201(19). See discussion of "good faith" in text accompanying note 87, supra.
352 N.Y. Clearing House Ass'n Rep. on the Uniform Commercial Code 25-26 (1961).
353 Restatement (Second), Agency § 120(1).
354 Id. at § 120(2); Glennan v. Rochester Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 209 N.Y. 12, 102
N.E. 537 (1913); 1 Paton, supra note 313, at 1079-81.
355 1 Paton, supra note 313 at 1085-86.
356 Glennan v. Rochester Trust & Safe Deposit Co., supra note 354.
357 UCC § 4-405(2). See generally Leary, supra note 334, at 369-70.
358 The law in New York is unsettled as to whether a bank having knowledge of the
actual insanity of its customer, not judicially declared incompetent, must honor his checks.
Riley v. Albany Say. Bank, 36 Hun 513 3rd Dep't, aff'd, 103 N.Y. 669 (1886); Mace v.
Rockland County Trust Co., 249 App. Div. 754, 291 N.Y. Supp. 835 (2d Dep't 1935). Com-
pare Wallis v. Manhattan Co., 2 Hall 495 (N.Y.S. Ct., 1829).
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F. Duty to Examine Returned Vouchers (4-406)
Although not governed by statute in New York, decisional law im-
poses the duty on depositors to use reasonable care in examining re-
turned vouchers and reporting unauthorized signatures and alterations.3 59
The Code includes a provision requiring the depositor to exercise rea-
sonable care and promptness in examining his statements and items.3 60
On a showing by the bank that the customer failed to exercise reasonable
care and promptness, the bank is able to avoid liability on an altered
item or an item bearing the unauthorized signature of the customer.
The customer is further precluded from asserting unauthorized signa-
tures or alterations by the same wrongdoer on items paid by the payor
during a period measured from the fourteenth calendar day after the
availability of the first item and statement (or measured from an earlier
date if reasonable) until notification by the customer.361 Backstopping
these hard to define duties imposed on customers are the absolute time
limits, later provided in the same section.362 A one-year statute of limita-
tion is provided as to the drawer's signature and alterationi.1 63 The Code
extends New York's two-year statute of limitations as to forged or
unauthorized indorsements to three years.3 6 4 The Code section further
differs from the present statutes in: (1) its application to any "item,"
not merely checks; (2) the inclusion of any alterations, not merely
"raising"; and (3) the application of this rule where the bank merely
holds the customer's statement and items pursuant to his request or
otherwise makes them available to him.
Part 5: Collection of Documentary Drafts
These four sections, 6 " located in article 3 in the 1952 draft, 66 add
novel provisions regulating the handling of documentary drafts processed
by banks for collection but normally payable by parties other than banks.
There is very scanty New York authority in point.'67 To be read in
There is authority that the adjudication of insanity itself is regarded as notice for the
purpose of terminating the agency of a bank to deal with collateral whether or not the
bank, in fact, knows of the adjudication. McNerney v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 284 App. Div.
21, 130 N.Y.S.2d 152 (4th Dep't 1954), aff'd, 308 N.Y. 916, 127 N.E.2d 79 (1955). The Code,
in requiring actual knowledge of the adjudication, would change present law.
The Court in the McNerney case held that the bank's agency, as pledgee, was coupled
with an interest and not revoked.
359 Critten v. Chemical Natl Bank, 171 N.Y. 219, 63 N.E. 969 (1902).
360 UCC § 4-406(1).
361 UCC § 4-406(2).
8362 UCC § 4-406(4).
363 Ibid. Accord N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 326.
364 Compare UCC § 4-406(4) with N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 43.
865 UCC §§ 4-501, 4-502, 4-503, 4-504.
366 See text following note 221 supra.
3867 See Hogan & Penney, "Annotations of the Uniform Commercial Code to the Statutory
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conjunction with this part is the earlier section 4-210 permitting a pre-
senting party to notify the primary party that the instrument is held
at the bank for acceptance or payment.
3 68
CONCLUSION
Lest the foregoing discussion stir apprehension in the mind of the
reader having labored this far, let it be said again that articles 3 and 4
are basically restatements of present law. Of necessity, attention has
been directed to innovations. Largely unsung were the instance after
instance of rephrasings or repetitions of present N.I.L. and other statu-
tory provisions. With few exceptions the new statute appears to bring
us the best of old and new. What has worked and proven reasonable
is continued. Most of the old questions have been answered. This is not
to say for a moment that the new statute is perfect or free from per-
plexities. Indeed, a whole new generation of critics with scalpel and
pen "at the ready" have even now undertaken the task of raising new
and as yet unnoticed questions of statutory interpretation. Though the
practicing bar should take comfort in the notion that many of their
problems have been solved, they should also be mindful of potential
difficulties on the road ahead. I am sure that they would not begrudge
scholars this happy prospect. After all, this and the confusion of genera-
tions of law students are the principal objects of the scholar's life.
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368 Compare N.I.L. § 74 (N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 134) (instrument must be
exhibited).
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